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Abstract
This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20
European Commission decisions over 2000–2004. It describes the prop-
erties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a
market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but
more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agree-
ment and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members,
methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel sup-
pliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational
procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s orga-
nizational structure.
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Introduction
A recent paper reviewed various approaches to detecting collusion using
patterns in firm behavior (Harrington, 2006). The efficacy of looking
for patterns in prices and quantities relies on knowing what to look for.
What does cartel behavior look like? How is it distinguishable from
competitive behavior? Towards better addressing those questions, this
paper delves deeper into cartels and explores how they operate. How
a collusive outcome – in terms of price and an allocation of market
supply – is determined. How a collusive outcome is monitored and
enforced. How often a cartel meets and how a cartel’s organizational
structure is designed. The hope is that such an exercise will produce a
better understanding of how cartels operate and generate a richer set
of collusive markers based on market data.
This paper does not engage in an empirical analysis as it is normally
conceived. Rather, the approach is to glean what one can from about 20
cartels for which there is detailed information.1 Though we will not be
able to draw any definitive (that is, statistically significant) conclusions
and indeed any claims are necessarily speculative, this is partially offset
1 It is more in the style of the classic studies by Stocking and Watkins (1946, 1948) and
Hay and Kelly (1974).
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by being able to offer finer details about cartels which will suggest a
richer set of collusive markers.2 It needs to be emphasized that the
case studies are largely confined to providing information during the
episode of collusion. Thus, claims about how cartel behavior differs
from competitive behavior will either rely on using general knowledge of
competitive behavior (rather than knowledge about how this particular
industry behaves when firms are not colluding) or reported information
about how the colluding firms sought to change their practices.
In addition to making progress on identifying collusive markers, this
analysis may also have implications for future directions in the theory of
cartels. By identifying empirical regularities and institutional features
of hard-core cartels, this information can be used to guide theoretical
modelling. The next big step in the theory of collusion is apt to be the
construction of models of hard-core cartels that take account of the
manner in which firms coordinate and communicate and the realities
of dealing with firm asymmetries. As firms run the risk of incurring
penalties by engaging in explicit collusion, a simple revealed preference
argument tells us that the outcomes under explicit collusion must be
different from those under tacit collusion. What is needed are models
that are designed for hard-core cartels and this requires using the rich
institutional detail that case studies offer.3
The primary source material for this study are European Commis-
sion decisions over 2000–2004.4 These cases comprise cartel activity
going back to the 1970s though largely cover activity in the 1980s and
90s. While the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice reg-
ularly issues Press Releases, these are typical one or two pages in length
which provide minimal details as to how cartels actually function. In
contrast, the European Commission decisions can range from 30 to over
200 pages and provide vast information on the manner in which firms
2 By a collusive marker I mean some property of firm behavior which is much more consistent
with collusion than with competition.
3 One might argue that explicit collusion may only entail meeting once to coordinate on
behavioral rules that are identical to what would have emerged under tacit collusion. To
the contrary, hard-core cartels meet frequently and regularly. Firms are then continually
running the risk of discovery and presumably they do so because these meetings generate
more profitable outcomes than tacit collusion.
4 One decision, seamless steel tubes, is actually from December 1999.
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colluded. My collection of cases were drawn from two online sources:
Official Journal of the European Union5 and “Cases” at DG Com-
petition of the European Commission.6 These cases encompass about
2/3rds of the relevant cases during that time period and represent, to
the best of my knowledge, an unbiased sample.7
There have been several recent studies that perform a similar exer-
cise to that conducted in this paper. Connor (2001) offers a highly
detailed description and analysis of cartel behavior, though his focus
is restricted to the citric acid, lysine, and vitamins cartels. Levenstein
and Suslow (2001, 2004) provide case studies of bromine, citric acid,
graphite electrodes, seamless steel tubes, and vitamins but their anal-
ysis is more structural – characterizing industry conditions – with less
coverage of cartel operations. Using a large set of European Commis-
sion and U. S. Department of Justice decisions on price-fixing, Grout
and Sonderegger (2005) provide a comprehensive examination of car-
tels. Related work is by Symeonedis (2003), who focuses on cartels in
the United Kingdom, and Levenstein and Suslow (2006). The analy-
ses of those papers focus on identifying industry traits that result in
cartel formation, while my emphasis is on describing cartel behavior.
From the perspective of screening for cartels, those studies are useful
for implementing a structural screening approach – identifying those
industries for which a cartel is likely to emerge – while the current
study is designed to support a behavioral screening approach – identi-
fying patterns in market data consistent with a cartel operating.
Section 2 reviews the agreements made regarding price and the allo-
cation of the market. Procedures for sustaining that agreement are dis-
cussed in Section 3 and this includes monitoring, punishments, and the
handling of external disruptions. Section 4 focuses on the frequency of
meetings and the organizational structure of the cartel, while Section 5
offers a few brief concluding remarks. Appendix A provides, by way
of background, a brief description of each of the industries – product
5 <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOIndex.do>
6 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases>
7 For an excellent background on cartel policy in the European Union, see Harding and
Julian (2003).
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description, geographic markets, companies, and cartel duration – and
Appendix B lists the primary sources used in the study.
Warning: It is important to note two possible sources of bias to
the case material. First, I am drawing cartels from the population of
discovered and successfully prosecuted cartels. There is no reason to
believe that this is an unbiased sample of the population of cartels
which is the actual population of interest. It is possible that discovered
cartels are the less effective ones and that is why they were discovered.
Furthermore, there is the decision of the antitrust authority (which in
my case is largely though not exclusively the European Commission)
to prosecute a case. Similarly, there may be a bias to pursue “easy”
cases or cases brought forward under the leniency program or cases
pursued in other geographic jurisdictions. What biases to our analysis
are introduced by this selection process is unclear but, once again, there
is concern that the sample of cartels may not be representative. That
our knowledge of cartels of recent vintage is largely limited to those that
have been discovered is an intrinsic challenge we face when studying
cartels. Second, the primary source of the material comes from one
side of the case – the prosecutorial side in the form of the European
Commission. There may be a different story to tell if the defendants’
perspective was also part of the material. That the leniency program
was used in many of these cases suggests that at least some of the
information was provided by the cartel members themselves. With these
caveats in place, let us move forward.
2
What are the Properties of a
Collusive Outcome?
Of the cartels reviewed, the canonical collusive outcome is characterized
by an agreement in both price and the allocation of supply across cartel
members. Let me briefly summarize some of the findings of this section.
In Section 2.1, I discuss agreement with respect to price. In all cartels,
firms had common prices. When the product was homogeneous – such
as vitamins or gases – this was a straightforward exercise. When there
was a wide array of feasible products, the cartel would either agree to
a set of standardized products or use a sophisticated pricing rule that
conditioned on the features of the product. Collusion not only meant
higher prices but typically fewer prices, with a smaller number of dis-
counts and less variation in prices across customer types. Collusion
also extended to prices for ancillary services and non-price dimensions
in order to avoid cheating through these avenues. Though, when col-
lusion spanned markets with different currencies, the cartel strived to
avoid arbitrage opportunities, this often proved challenging and, as a
result, significant differences in prices emerged. The implementation of
the collusive price was typically characterized by a gradual change in
price with firms making this price change in a staggered manner.
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In Section 2.2, the allocation of supply is described. Almost all
cartels had a market-sharing scheme that either involved setting sales
quotas or allocating customers or territories; a cartel might use one or
more of this schemes. In implementing sales quotas, firms would often
exchange information to arrive at some shared assessment of market
size and then, based on that assessment, set minimum volumes or an
allocation of market shares. It was common to freeze market shares at
their levels in the one to three years prior to cartel formation. In some
cases, there was tremendous stability in targeted market shares over
time. Historical precedence was also used in implementing a customer
allocation scheme. A reduction in imports was a property of several
cartels as they implemented the home-market principle which specified
that a firm should be given preference in supplying its domestic market.
2.1 Price
What it means to “collude in price” varied greatly across the cartels
examined. The members of the lysine cartel viewed one market for
lysine – the global market – and thereby coordinated on a single price.
The citric acid cartel had only two prices – a regular price and a dis-
counted price for select large customers. At the other end of the spec-
trum, the electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel
instituted a sophisticated pricing rule which, in principle, allowed for
many different prices depending on the particular characteristics of the
product and the buyer.
One property that was common to all of the cartel examined was
that the collusive (though not necessarily actual) prices were the same
for all cartel members. A second feature common to several cartels was
that they would agree to a “target” (or “recommended”) price and a
“floor” (or “minimum” or “bottom”) price which was lower than the
target price:
The cartel pursued four main objectives, namely the allocation of
specific sales quotas to each member and their adherence to those
quotas; the fixing of target and/or ‘floor’ prices; the elimination of
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price discounts; and the exchange of specific customer information.
[Citric acid – EC, 80]1
In addition to target prices, participants also agreed to “mini-
mum” for each national market (so-called “floor” or “rock bottom”
prices). [Methionine – EC, 68]
Table 2.1 shows the target (“list”) and floor (“lowest”) prices for
vitamin B2 in German Deutschemarks (DEM) for products intended
for human consumption (USP) and non-human consumption (Feed),
and for vitamin B5:
Table 2.1 Vitamin B2 Cartel Prices
Date Type List Lowest
June 1, 1991 USP 110 106
Feed 89 84
October 1, 1991 USP 117 112
Feed 94 89
October 1, 1992 Feed 99 94
April 1, 1993 USP 122 116
Feed 102 97
Source: Vitamins, EC, 284
Table 2.2 Vitamin B5 Cartel Prices
Date List Lowest
October 1, 1991 29.50 28.50
April 1, 1992 32.50 31.00
April 1, 1993 36.50 35.00
Source: Vitamins, EC, 304
The distinction between a target price and a floor price was never
made clear in the case material. One conjecture is that if a firm priced
below the floor price, it would then be considered in violation of the
agreement. In comparison, a target price would be the price that the
cartel believed the market could sustain and firms would be able to sell
their agreed-upon quantities.
1 [Citric acid – EC, 80] refers to paragraph 80 of the European Commission Decision relating
to citric acid. The complete citation is provided in Appendix B. When more than one
European Commission Decision is cited for an industry, they are denoted as EC1 or EC2.
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In two cases, the cartel agreed on the final product price even though
some or all of its sales were not to end-users. Carbonless paper was
sold in “reels” to retailers and directly to end-users, while “sheets”
were sold exclusively to retailers. The firms agreed to a final product
price for reels which obviously meant coordinating on a price for reels
to merchants so as to support that final product price. Coordinating
on the price for end-users was initiated by the sorbates cartel but then
discontinued because of the difficulty in implementing it:
From 1989 to 1992, target prices agreed for each EEA country
referred to the prices to end user customers. During the 1993 spring
joint meeting, however, it was agreed that target prices should
in future relate to the price to be charged to dealers, given the
difficulties encountered among the Japanese producers in finding
information about and controlling prices to end users. [Sorbates –
EC2, 100]
2.1.1 Controlling cheating on quality, product traits,
and ancillary services
A more challenging matter for the cartel in setting price arises when
there are potentially many variants of the product. The relevance of
this issue varies across products according to the diversity of consumer
preferences and the technological constraints for providing different
products. For example, this was an issue with graphite electrodes –
an input in the production of steel – but not an issue with vitamins.
One approach is for firms to agree on an array of standardized prod-
ucts – which meant cartel members would only supply those products –
and assigning a price to each standardized product. Alternatively, firms
could coordinate on a pricing formula that would prescribe a price based
on a product’s characteristics.
In the market for isostatic graphite, it was because of collusion that
the industry created its first “product grouping standard.”
In order to be able to fix prices according to equivalent categories
of products, the parties established an appropriate Product Group-
ing Standard. This classification of grades was done in accordance
with the product applications: EDM (electro discharge machining),
10 What are the Properties of a Collusive Outcome?
CC/GP (continuous casting/ general purpose) and Semiconduc-
tors. Much effort was devoted to obtaining a proper classifica-
tion (the issue recurrently appeared on the agenda of meetings).
[Isostatic Graphite – EC, 99]
The approach of having standardized products was also taken in
the graphite electrodes cartel as the firms:
agreed to charge certain premiums on the price of large-size elec-
trodes, namely a surcharge on the price charged for standard 24-
inch electrodes (for example, a 10% premium for 28-inch electrodes
and a 40% premium for 30-inch electrodes). [Graphite electrodes –
EC, 56]
However, cartel member Showa Denko destabilized the arrangement
when it introduced a 28.75-inch model and priced it at the 28-inch
model. The other cartel members complained as they saw this as a
form of cheating, though offering higher quality rather than a lower
price. Market leaders SGL and UCAR demanded that Showa Denko
either stop selling it or use the price for the 30-inch model. Showa
Denko chose to discontinue production.
Standardizing the product may then be important to avoiding
cheating through superior quality while maintaining the cartel price. To
avoid the type of event that happened in the graphite electrodes cartel,
the electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products (EMCG)
cartel specified that upon introducing a “technically new design,” a
firm must inform the cartel prior to offering a price quotation on it.
[EMCG – EC, 130]
Collusive Marker: Increased product standardization.
An alternative approach to having standardized products is for firms
to agree to a pricing formula. This was so impressively done in the
electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel that it
is worth describing their formula in its entirety:
The most important purpose of the cartel was to agree on the prices
to be charged to customers in different countries for the many
different varieties of electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite
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products. For this purpose, the cartel members first agreed on
a pricing method which calculated the sales price by reference
to a number of factors. The basis of the scheme was the calcu-
lation of the price for carbon brushes. These were divided into
three groups: industrial brushes, midget brushes and exceptions.
Within each of the first two groups, the volume of the carbon or
graphite material in question would be determined in cubic cen-
timetre. Depending on the material, each volume corresponded
to a “basic material price” figure, which was displayed in iden-
tical table format in each company’s internal price list. To the
basic material would be added a “standard fittings price”, calcu-
lated by reference to the sectional area of the material in ques-
tion in square centimetre. To this figure would be added charges
for additional machining, such as the inclusion of screws, plugs,
springs, grooves and other items. The total figure thus resulting,
plus any additional surcharges, was known by the cartel members
as the “scheme price” or “bareme price” in an expression bor-
rowed from the French and often used by cartel members. The
bareme price was not a real sales price in any particular cur-
rency, but rather a relative value, indicating, for instance, that
a complicated large brush should cost x times more than a small
simple brush. In this sense, the bareme prices had a certain com-
mercial logic, as they were based on incremental increases in the
costs of materials and tooling. Nevertheless, what was in no way
commercially inescapable was the level of detail and uniformity
in the price calculation method agreed among members of the
cartel, the result of which was that, by using the price calcula-
tion scheme, each member would arrive in principle at exactly the
same price increase, in relative terms, for each additional cubic
centimetre of carbon used or for each additional screw or other
tooling added. Nor did the cartel stop at that. To move from a
relative value to a real sales price, the bareme price was multi-
plied by two “co-efficients”. First, the bareme was multiplied by a
“currency co-efficient”, which converted the value into a real price
in the currency of the country where the brushes were being sold.
This figure was then multiplied by a “quantity co-efficient”, which
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gave the buyer a discounted unit price in return for purchasing a
higher volume of products. The final figure represented the unit
price in local currency, franco domicile. The quantity co-efficient
differed depending on the customer. OEM customers received a
larger volume rebate than either resellers or end-users. [EMCG –
EC2, 91-3]
Note that this pricing rule also allowed for quantity discounts
and dealt with currency issues; two issues that will be addressed in
Section 2.1.2.
Though controlling “quality cheating” may not be as relevant with
commodities such as vitamins and gases, there are similar ways in which
firms can cheat. One method is to offer ancillary services at low prices.
A second method is to bundle the collusive good with some other goods
and price the bundle in such a way that the firm is effectively charging
below the collusive price.
As an example of the perceived need to control firms’ prices for
ancillary services, firms in the industrial and medical gases cartel agreed
not only about price but also “trading conditions”. Specifically, this
meant agreeing to minimum transport charges and a minimum rate for
renting a gas cylinder. The cartel also introduced a drop charge on bulk
deliveries and an environmental and safety charge as devices to further
raise the effective price. Failure to agree on any of these other charges
could have undermined the cartel as firms could then price gas at the
agreed-upon level but cheat by offering, say, free transport.
The issue of controlling other dimensions than the price of the pri-
mary product or service was central to collusion between Christie’s
and Sotheby’s in the fine arts auction houses cartel. The centerpiece of
their agreement was a non-negotiable commission schedule for clients
(which is provided in Appendix A). (A client would contract an auction
house to sell their property at auction in exchange for a commission
on the revenue collected.) Prior to that agreement, the auction houses
would routinely offer discounts off of the publicly announced commis-
sion schedule; even going so far as to offer a zero commission rate
(though they also charged a buyer’s commission). In addition, there
were many other features that an auction house might offer a customer
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to attract business. The cartel sought to control as many of these as
possible.
Going over the various subjects they had discussed in their pre-
vious conversations, [Christie’s Chairman of the Board Anthony]
Tennant summarized the topics they had already agreed upon:
From September 1993, neither Christie’s nor Sotheby’s would give
any “straight” guarantees – the kind, where the auction house
did not get to share in the proceeds if the winning bid exceeded
the guarantee price promised to the consigner. Both firms would
also abandon the practice of making advances on single lots, and
they would no longer make any loans to sellers below the prime
rate, known in England as the London Interbank Offered Rate,
or LIBOR. Dealers, or “trade” vendors, would be given a rate of
no better than 5%, and they would be obliged to pay their own
insurance costs, while trade buyers would be offered no more than
ninety days’ credit. Furthermore, Tennant noted, it was agreed
that the two firms would no longer pay more than 1% in intro-
ductory commissions to third parties when the deal in question
involved a zero seller’s commission. Nor would they make any offers
to sellers who were already under contract with the rival auction
house, although he insisted that Christie’s did not do that any-
way. Finally, he noted, Christie’s would cease making charitable
contributions [on the consigner’s behalf] if it saw that Sotheby’s
had stopped doing so. [Mason (2004, p. 119)]
Given the multiple dimensions in which they competed – not just
the commission rate – the auction houses were cognizant of the need
to close these potential loopholes by which a firm could cheat. Failure
to do so would only cause collusive profits to be dissipated.
Collusive Marker: Increased uniformity across firms in product price,
quality, and the prices for ancillary services.
Cheating can also occur with a commodity by bundling it with other
goods and implicitly pricing the collusive good below the agreed-upon
price. A cartel member claimed that one of the other members used
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this tactic in the vitamins cartel. One of the uses of vitamins is in
animal feed and some of the cartel members sold pre-mix – a blend
of vitamins which would then be mixed with animal feed – as well as
straight vitamins. In the case of the folic acid cartel, Takeda accused
Hoffmann LaRoche (also referred to as Roche) of pricing pre-mix low
so that Roche could put a price squeeze on independent suppliers of
pre-mix and thereby drive them out of the market and increase Roche’s
market power in the pre-mix market. This required implicitly charging
itself a lower price for folic acid than it was charging the independent
suppliers (which was at the cartel price). [Vitamins – EC, 370] A similar
complaint was made in connection with the vitamin B5 cartel as cartel
member Daiichi claimed that BASF and Roche were pricing their pre-
mix too low. [Vitamins – EC, 322]
2.1.2 Variation in prices across customers
A defining feature of collusion is obviously higher prices. What these
cases suggest, however, is that a second defining feature is greater
uniformity in price across customers. Subject to the important caveat
that data on the non-cartel phase is lacking, the case evidence suggests
that firms reduced the number of different prices charged to customers.
In particular, they sought to move from a regime characterized by a
list price and a series of ad hoc negotiated discounts to either a non-
negotiable price list that encompassed discounts (such as with the fine
arts auction houses cartel) or an agreed-upon set of discounts to the
list price (as with the citric acid cartel).
This increased uniformity in price across customers could have been
done for several reasons. It might have been done for simplicity; remem-
ber that firms had to discuss and then agree to every price and this
was a recurring situation. More prices not only meant more time spent
meeting – which raised the chances of discovery by the authorities – but
perhaps also more opportunities to reach a disagreement and threaten
the collapse of the cartel. A second reason is that fewer prices may
have made monitoring easier. With more customer-specific prices, it
may become harder to document whether the price charged by a firm
was appropriate given the market or customer type.
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Though there was clearly a movement to having fewer prices across
customers, many cartels still had more than one price. The citric acid
cartel sought to have a single price but perceived there to be a necessity
to offer a discount to the largest customers:
It was further agreed that no customers would be granted discounts
and all would be expected to pay the list price. This was designed
to prevent any participant from selling below the agreed prices. An
exception was made for the five major consumers of citric acid since
it was unrealistic to expect them to pay the published list price.
It was accepted that these customers could be offered a discount
of up to 3% off the list price. [Citric acid – EC, 83]
A similar discounting strategy was deployed in the plasterboard
cartel as discounts were generally eliminated except for large customers:
“Firms agreed to raise price and eliminate all special discounts with the
exception of those for large retailers.” [Plasterboard – EC, 321]
The movement to fewer discounts and more price uniformity across
customers was quite common. In the copper plumbing tubes cartel,
firms coordinated quite closely with respect to rebate levels in order to
maintain collusive margins:
in order to avoid price erosion through large rebates, the suppliers
established guidelines on rebate levels. The plumbing tube manu-
facturers in the respective national markets divided customers into
three or four groups according to size, without, however, discussing
individual customers. [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 207]
There may be several motivations for offering some discounts. It may
just reflect price discrimination and the higher profit that comes from
it. When it was stated in the citric acid case that the major customers
would not pay list, it might have been meant that they would resist it
by postponing demand and consuming out of inventories. Furthermore,
the cartel might be concerned about creating suspicions that there is
collusion since offering no discounts off of list would be inexplicable in
light of past practice.
In a competitive environment, one could imagine a firm moving
to an “everyday low price” by eliminating discounts (or sales) while
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reducing the list price. This makes the combination of fewer discounts
off of list prices along with a higher list price suggestive that firms are
coordinating their behavior.
Collusive Marker: Higher list prices and reduced variation in prices
across customers.
Though there did not appear to be much disagreement among firms
over price, there is a well-documented episode of disagreement with
regards to discounts. In the isostatic graphite cartel, members disagreed
about the 20% discount to machine shops and distributors; the source
of the disagreement appeared to be the different composition of cartel
members’ demands.
Prices for machine shops (MS) in Europe were discussed at length
during this meeting. [cartel members] SGL and LCL advocated a
strict enforcement of minimum prices while the Japanese suppliers
were not in favour of such drastic approach. SGL and LCL favoured
eliminating a separate MS price . . . and to have a price only for
large end users. The Japanese suppliers which depended heavily
on selling to independent machine shops disagreed with the argu-
ments of the European producers. The difference in the distribu-
tion methods of the respective producers appeared to be the major
reason for this disagreement. SGL and LCL distributed its prod-
ucts through own subsidiaries throughout almost all of Europe and
often directly to large end users with machining capability. Toyo
Tanso distributed its products through subsidiaries in some coun-
tries and through distributors/machine shops in countries where
they did not have subsidiaries. Tokai Carbon and Ibiden relied on
sales to independent distributors and machine shops. No conclu-
sion was reached. [Isostatic graphite – EC, 137]
2.1.3 Variation in prices across countries
Many cartels also strived to achieve uniformity of prices across coun-
tries. Indeed, a continual concern for a number of global cartels was
avoiding arbitrage opportunities due to currency fluctuations and the
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inability of the cartel to adequately adjust prices. The concern was that
resellers would buy the product in a country where the price is low and
sell it where the price is high. Such actions would effectively reduce the
average transaction price and, furthermore, could cause cartel instabil-
ity because the burden would fall unequally across firms; firms where
the price is low would benefit by selling more while firms where the
price is high would suffer because of reduced sales due to imports.
Most global cartels were quite explicit about acting to avoid the
creation of arbitrage opportunities and achieving what they called
“harmonization” in prices. In the choline chloride cartel:
An agreement was made to increase prices world-wide to identical
levels. These identical price levels around the world would not only
increase profitability but also help to avoid destabilising exports
between regions. [Choline chloride – EC, 68]
Similarly, consider the nucleotides cartel: “The final goal, as
expressed by Takeda, was to have one world price . . .” [Nucleotides –
EC-108]
Some global cartels would use the US dollar (USD) and the German
Deutschmark (DEM or DM) as the benchmark currencies (though pre-
sumably the Euro has now replaced the latter). This may require reg-
ular adjusting of price across countries.
Prices were agreed in DM and were adjusted so that the cross-
country difference within Europe was not more than 5–10%.
[Graphite electrodes – EC, 60]
One of the main preoccupations of BASF and Roche was to
ensure that currency fluctuations did not lead to price differen-
tials between the regions and consequent trans-shipment by deal-
ers. Thus when the US dollar became strong in relation to the
Deutschmark, the two European producers were concerned to raise
the European prices so as to deter dealers selling from Europe to
North America. [Vitamins (B5) – EC, 321]
Prices were established in both USD and DEM terms. In the
European market the DEM was used as the benchmark currency
and converted into the appropriate national currency when quoting
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and charging prices to national customers. Given the global char-
acter of the citric acid market and the use of the DEM and USD
as benchmark currencies, the value of the exchange rate between
the two was critical to the establishment of sustainable and com-
petitive prices, particularly to avoid trans-shipments between the
two areas. Pricing decisions were taken by the cartel members in
the light of this important consideration. The relative strength of
the DEM vis-à-vis the USD between mid-1991 and mid-1992 (it
appreciated by almost 20%) meant that citric acid price increases
for areas with prices quoted in USD were more frequent and of
a higher aggregated amount than in DEM denominated markets,
essentially to compensate for the DEM’s revaluation. [Citric acid –
EC, 82, 93]
In spite of the effort to achieve harmonization, the price gap could
become quite considerable as noted in these three episodes.
The wide gap between the target price in Europe (6.20) and the
going price in Asia (5.25–5.40) caused concern of Asian sales flow-
ing back to Europe. [Methionine – EC, 145]
The participants considered in particular that the European
price at that time was 22% higher than the US price. They were
concerned that parallel importers would be attracted if the price
differential increased and concluded that it was not possible to
increase the European price further at that moment. [Lysine –
EC, 82]
SGL states that price harmonisation was sought in Europe as,
due to exchange rate distortions, prices in countries such as the
United Kingdom and Italy were around 30–40% lower than in
Germany. [Isostatic graphite – EC, 134]
In trying to identify an associated collusive marker, the difficulty is
that we do not know whether there was more or less price harmoniza-
tion under collusion. It is clear from the documentary evidence that lack
of price harmonization arose under collusion and that cartels sought to
eliminate it. One might imagine that without collusion, firms would
supply to meet demand in each country and this would allow arbitrage
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opportunities to be exploited and prices equalized across countries (or
the differential between countries’ prices to be less than transportation
and reselling costs). With collusion, firms were typically restraining
supply – as is reviewed in Section 2.2 – and this could allow disparities
in price to exist across countries. On the basis of this argument, the
following collusive marker is tentatively put forth.
Collusive Marker: Increased variation in prices across countries.
2.1.4 Implementation of price changes
Having agreed upon some price change, there is the matter as to how
a cartel actually implements it. Two common features were: 1) cartels
tend to gradually raise price; and 2) cartel members would sequentially,
not simultaneously, implement the new price or price schedule. Let us
provide examples documenting both patterns.
2.1.4.1 Gradual and periodic price changes
A number of cartels were quite explicit about gradually raising price.
Indeed, most cartel price paths show a gradual increase. This was exhib-
ited for citric acid and lysine (Connor, 2001), several of the vitamins
(Levenstein and Suslow, 2001), and graphite electrodes (Harrington,
2004a). Price may be raised gradually for several reasons. It might be
done to avoid buyer resistance whereby they hold off purchases and
work down their inventories. Secondly, cartel members might be uncer-
tain as to how high a price would be stable in which case they may pre-
fer to gradually raise it rather than risk a price war by initially setting
price at what proves to be an unstable level. Thirdly, a gradual price
increase may serve to avoid discovery of collusion by buyers.2 Of course,
a gradual raising of price may simply be driven by gradual increases in
cost that served to increase the optimal collusive price. In some cases –
such as the graphite electrodes cartel (Harrington, 2004a) – that can
be confidently dismissed.
2 For a theoretical analysis, see Harrington (2004b, 2005) and Harrington and Chen (2005).
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This intent to gradually raise price is quite apparent when firms, at a
point in time, decided on a series of future price increases. At a meeting
of the choline chloride cartel on November 16, 1992, they agreed to the
following sequence of global prices for three product variants:
Table 2.3 Cartel Prices – Choline Chloride
Date of Planned Price Increase 50% Dry 60% Dry 75% Liquid
January 1993 1000 1200 1000
July 1993 1100 1320 1100
January 1994 1100 1320 1200
Source: Choline Chloride – EC, 77
This was similarly the case in the carbonless paper cartel as “the
participants agreed on several consecutive price increases expressed in
percentage form for each EEA country.” [Carbonless paper – EC, 78]
More specifically, “it was agreed that the price would be increased in
two stages on 1 July and on 1 September 1994, both times by 5%.”
[Carbonless paper – EC, 211]
Steady price increases were a trademark of the vitamins cartel. For
example, the prices of vitamins A and E were usually raised in incre-
ments of 5% [Vitamins – EC, 182] and such a gradual increase was also
noted for vitamin B1:
From 1991 until about 1993, the price of vitamin B1 was gradually
increased by the cartel. In 1991, the producers raised the market
price from below DEM 65 to DEM 68/kg. [Vitamins – EC, 255]
The movement to more uniform prices across customers could also
be done gradually. In the district heating pipes cartel: “A common price
list was devised; agreed discounts were to be progressively reduced with
the declared aim of raising prices 30% in two years.”3
There is also evidence that price changes were performed with some
periodicity when firms were colluding. This was documented for a num-
ber of the vitamins cartels. For the vitamins A and E cartel,
During the 1991 concerted initiative, new prices were initiated each
quarter; from the beginning of 1993, prices were increased as a rule
3Competition Policy Newsletter, 1999 February, Number 1, pp. 27–8.
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once a year, usually on 1 April, with 1 October being kept as a
fallback date in addition. [Vitamins – EC, 210]
While for vitamin B5,
During the period of the cartel, the three producers contrived to
raise the price of vitamin B5 at regular intervals in a series of
concerted price increases. [Vitamins – EC, 317]
Of course, it is quite possible that non-collusive prices reveal the
same gradual and periodic nature. Though the documentary evidence
in the Commission decisions do not speak to that issue, a recent study
by Marshall et al. (2005) does. It finds that the periodicity of vitamins
prices was greater when vitamins manufacturers were colluding. The
data is comprised of the announced price increases reported in two
weekly trade journals over 1970–2001 for vitamins A (Acetate 650 Feed
Grade and Acetate 500 USP), E (Acetate 50% Spray Dried Feed Grade
and E Acetate Oil USP), C (Ascorbic Acid 100% USP), Beta Carotene
(FS 30%), B2 (Riboflavin 96% Feed Grade and Riboflavin USP), and
B5 (Calpan Feed Grade and Calpan USP). This time period included
both non-cartel and cartel regimes. A logit model was estimated for the
probability that a new price is announced in a given month conditional
on the amount of time that has passed since the previous price change
and taking account of a several possible cost and demand triggers for a
price change. During the non-cartel regime, they found no statistically
significant relationship between delay – the time since the last price
announcement – and the probability of making a new price announce-
ment. In contrast, during the cartel regime, there was a statistically
significant positive relationship between delay and the probability of
making a new price announcement. These results are consistent with
the periodicity of price announcements under collusion which may be
due to the periodicity of cartel meetings, which is an issue addressed
in Section 4.
2.1.4.2 Staggered price changes
That a cartel was concerned about detection is evident in the explicit
avoidance of making simultaneous price changes. In many cartels, there
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was a clear orchestration of who would move first and when other firms
would follow which could be in days, weeks, or even months. This
has been documented for cartels in carbonless paper, electrical and
mechanical carbon and graphite products, copper plumbing tubes, fine
arts auction houses, and sorbates.
At the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 the participants
also agreed on a system for launching the price increases according
to which AWA would lead the price increases and others would
follow. As stated in the minutes: ‘AWA will lead announcement of
following increases per market. To follow, Koehler AG, Zanders,
Stora, Sappi, Torras’. [Carbonless paper – EC, 233]
For the new prices to take effect, one of the cartel mem-
bers would circulate its new price list to customers at some time
between January and March in the year following the Techni-
cal Committee meeting. The other cartel members would follow
suit and issue their new price lists over the following weeks or
months, thereby trying to create the impression that the compa-
nies concerned took their pricing decisions autonomously. The car-
tel members broadly rotated who would issue their price lists first
in each country. Sometimes they also collectively thought up pos-
sible explanations they could give to their clients as justification
for the price increases. [EMCG – EC, 101]
. . . pricelists were usually issued once a year (in autumn) by
the leader in the respective national market. The market leader
generally sent, or otherwise conveyed, the pricelist to certain com-
petitors before its publication, to invite adaptation of their prices.
The pricelist was, however, also freely available in the market (for
example, from customers). The other producers would then gen-
erally issue a similar price list within one to two weeks. [. . .] other
suppliers were expected to adapt their prices to the leader’s price
list. [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 204]
On 9 March 1995 Christie’s publicly announced that it would
be instituting a new sliding scale of rates based on the value of
the property sold. It was made clear that under the new pol-
icy scale commission would be non-negotiable. The new charges
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were to apply from 3 April 1995 for property scheduled for auc-
tion at Christie’s salesrooms world-wide beginning 1 September
1995 when the new auction “season” opened. . . . On 13 April 1995
Sotheby’s duly followed. [Fine arts auction houses – EC, 109–111]
After each joint meeting, the agreed target prices were
announced to agents, distributors and customers. Hoechst was usu-
ally the first to announce the new price in Europe, followed by the
Japanese producers (for example, two months later). [Sorbates –
EC, 103]
When the cartel was global, the firm that took the lead in changing
price could vary across countries. The identity of the leader could also
vary over time.
In order to implement the prices agreed between them (and com-
municated to other producers), SGL and UCAR arranged in
advance which of them would act first to announce the increase to
customers. Once the price was established, it could not be under-
cut. Which of the two was designated to ‘lead’ the price increase in
a particular national market in Europe depended on their respec-
tive positions in that market. Since SGL had a more important
presence in Germany and Scandinavia than UCAR, it had the
responsibility for announcing and leading the price increase in
those markets. UCAR generally led the price increases in France
and United Kingdom. In the other two major Community markets
for electrodes, Italy and Spain, where UCAR and SGL had roughly
equal market shares, they decided on each occasion which one of
them would ‘publicly’ act as the price leader to get the new price
established in the market. Price increases were typically staggered
over time across countries. [Graphite electrodes – EC, 66, 69]
If a price increase was decided, Roche usually took the lead
and announced first. Apparently however, it occasionally asked
BASF to lead the increase publicly. . . . The parties normally agreed
that one producer should first ‘announce’ the increase, either in a
trade journal or in direct communication with major customers.
Once the price increase was announced by one cartel member, the
others would generally follow suit. In this way the concerted price
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increases could be passed off, if challenged, as the result of price
leadership in an oligopolistic market. [Vitamins (A, E) – EC, 183,
203–4]
Moving sequentially was not without a cost however. During the
time between when one firm raises its prices and the other firms follow,
the price leader could lose sales. This is not only costly to that firm but
it could risk the stability of the cartel if the lost sales are sufficiently
great to cause retraction of the price increase or movement to an even
lower price in order to regain market share. Indeed, it appeared this
almost caused the fine arts auction house cartel to collapse. Christie’s
had already announced, as part of the collusive arrangement, a non-
negotiable commission schedule. Sotheby’s had not yet followed and,
in the meantime, had secured a major consignment by offering a zero-
percent seller’s commission.
Having already announced its new nonnegotiable minimum of
2 percent, Christie’s was unable to match Sotheby’s offer. . . .
Christopher Davidge [CEO of Christie’s] was furious when he
learned that Sotheby’s had won the Alghanim consignment
because of the delay in matching Christie’s new nonnegotiable
rates. He began to fear that Brooks [Sotheby’s CEO] was double-
crossing him. [Mason (2004, p. 166)]
This was also a serious enough concern for the industrial and med-
ical gases cartel that they agreed to a moratorium on supplying other
firm’s customers for a period of two to five months each year while the
new price was being implemented. To execute that agreement, cartel
members would instruct their sales people to focus on retaining existing
customers:
That [cartel member] AGA put the moratorium into effect is shown
by the internal instructions it issued on 28 November 1989 . . . to
focus on implementing the 5% price increase with existing cus-
tomers and explaining that competitors could be expected to do
the same. Were attacks by competitors nevertheless to lead to price
concessions, such concessions should be reported to the manage-
ment. [Industrial and medical gases – EC1, 161]
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Air Liquide submitted an internal note regarding the price
increases for 1995 which instructs salesmen to focus on their own
clients (with the effect of respecting the moratorium) [Industrial
and medical gases – EC1, 180]
2.2 Quantity
Equally important to coordinating on price – and documentary evi-
dence reveals it was more important for many cartels – was coordi-
nating on the allocation of the market. All but a few cartels had an
explicit market sharing arrangement. In this section, we’ll review the
various allocation schemes and how they decided on a particular allo-
cation. Critical to these schemes is the monitoring of each firm’s supply
to ensure the agreed-upon allocation is implemented. That issue, along
with the types of punishment deployed when there was a violation, will
be reviewed in Section 3.
There were three forms of allocation schemes: i) sales quotas (which
I will use to refer to both an allocation of quantities and of market
shares); ii) exclusive territories (and, closely related, the home-market
principle); and iii) customer allocation. A cartel could pursue one or use
them in combination. In some cases, exclusive territories and customer
allocation were used to implement a sales quota scheme; the choline
chloride cartel used all three methods.
2.2.1 Sales quotas
The majority of the cartels used sales quotas. This could take the form
of a quantity that each firm was assigned to supply – which made
be interpreted as a target quantity or a minimum quantity – or of
an allocated share of the market. With respect to the latter, it was a
share of total demand if the cartel was all-inclusive or a share of the
cartel’s supply if it was not. Sales quotas could be set at the level of the
entire global market (if it was global), region (for example, Europe),
and country.
In the citric acid cartel, firms agreed to a global sales quota for each
firm and, as they viewed the market to be global, there was no further
disaggregation. Two months after specifying a fixed tonnage figure for
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Table 2.4 Allocation of ECAMA Market Shares (1991) – Citric Acid
Company Market Share
Haarman & Reimer 32.0%
ADM 26.3%
Jungbunzlauer 23.0%
Hoffman LaRoche 13.7%
Cerestar Bioproducts 5.0%
Source: Citric Acid, EC
each member, the cartel met again and converted these volumes into
market shares. Specifically, each firm was entitled to a percentage of
supply provided by the European Citric Acid Manufacturers Associa-
tion to which all cartel members belonged.4 [Citric acid – EC, 81, 97]
The resulting market shares are shown in Table 2.4
In the lysine cartel, the emphasis was on specifying a minimum
level of sales for each firm rather than a target.5 Compliance occurred
as long as each firm’s sales exceeded its minimum and if that held then
a firm was compliant even if it sold above its quota. This was made
clear by Terence Wilson, a senior executive for cartel member Archer
Daniels Midland (ADM), who was secretly taped at meetings of the
lysine cartel.
if I’m assured that I’m gonna get 67,000 tons by the year’s end,
we’re gonna sell it at the prices we agreed to and I frankly don’t
care what you sell it for. [Video transcript of “The International
Lysine Cartel at Work, 3/28/00,” U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division.]
The market’s bigger than we originally said it was. We just
took it. So we’re not in violation of nothin. [Eichenwald (2001,
p. 134–5)]
4 One speculation as to why they preferred market shares is that it provides an easy way in
which to handle market growth.
5 If all firms undercut the collusive price then it is possible they could all meet minimum
sales target. But that would not be a satisfactory outcome as each firm’s profit would be
low. It is then important to complement minimum sales targets with some form of price
monitoring.
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The lysine cartel chose to specify quotas for both the global market
and the European market.
Table 2.5 Sales Quotas (1992, tons) – Lysine
Company Global Sales (Market Share) European Sales (Market Share)
Ajinomoto 73,500 (39.7%) 34,000 (51.9%)
ADM 48,000 (25.9%) 5,000 (7.6%)
Kyowa 37,000 (20.0%) 8,000 (12.2%)
Sewon 20,500 (11.1%) 13,500 (20.6%)
Cheil 6,000 (3.2%) 5,000 (7.6%)
Source: Lysine – E, 77
From at least 1978 up until the mid-1990s, the sorbates cartel
engaged in volume agreements:
The agreements on volume quotas and target prices were inter-
linked. They were intended to enable each party to sell its allo-
cated volume at the highest possible price. The purpose of the
quota system was in fact to gradually increase the market price.
According to [cartel member] Chisso, the volume quotas prevented
the companies from competing for market share, which would have
driven prices down. [Sorbates – EC2, 108]
The sorbates cartel colluded in the European market and was
comprised of one European company, Hoechst, and four Japanese
producers: Chisso, Daicel, Nippon, and Ueno. At the general cartel
meeting, sales would be allocated between Hoechst and the Japanese
producers as a group. The four Japanese producers would then meet
and allocate their collective quota amongst themselves. The resulting
quotas are provided in Table 2.6. The entry in a cell is volume in
metric tons. For Hoechst and the Japanese firms, the market share is
in parentheses, while in parentheses for Chisso, Daicel, Nippon, and
Ueno is their share of the allocation to Japanese producers. Notice the
tremendous stability to market share quotas over this 15 year period,
especially among the four firms out of Japan.
Given the decision to allocate the market using sales quotas, there
is then the matter of settling upon what each firm’s sales quota would
be. This was generally a two-step process in which, in step one, firms
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would reach a shared assessment of market size and then, in step two,
agree to some allocation of the market. Determining market size was
explicitly noted in many Commission decisions.
Senior executives responsible for vitamin marketing in each com-
pany, together with some product managers, identified the size
of the market for vitamins A and E and then agreed the alloca-
tion between the four producers of the world and regional markets
on the basis of their respective achieved sales in 1988. [Vitamins,
EC, 163]
At a meeting held in Frankfurt in the autumn of 1987, Nip-
pon Soda, Rhône-Poulenc, Degussa (who chaired the meeting)
and Sumitomo exchanged and compared their respective esti-
mates of the total volume of the world market, gave their opin-
ions as to future incremental market growth and how to allocate
quotas between producers (the talk was of sharing in proportion
Table 2.6 Sales Quotas (metric tons (market share)) – Sorbates Cartel
Meeting Hoechst Japan. firms Chisso Daicel Nippon Ueno
Spr 79 1800 (44%) 2300 (56%) 580 (25.2%) 925 (40.2%) 354 (15.4%) 442 (19.2%)
Spr 80 2200 (50%) 2200 (50%) 554 (25.2%) 884 (40.2%) 339 (15.4%) 422 (19.2%)
Aug 80
Mar 81 2100 (51%) 2000 (49%)
June 81 504 (25.2%) 804 (40.2%) 308 (15.4%) 384 (19.2%)
Spr 82 2100 (51%) 2000 (49%) 504 (25.2%) 804 (40.2%) 308 (15.4%) 384 (19.2%)
Spr 83 1900 (51%) 1800 (49%) 454 (25.2%) 724 (40.2%) 277 (15.4%) 346 (19.2%)
Fall 83 (51%) (49%)
Feb 84 2300 (52%) 2100 (48%) 529 (25.2%) 844 (40.2%) 323 (15.4%) 403 (19.2%)
Feb 85 2400 (52%) 2200 (48%) 554 (25.2%) 884 (40.2%) 339 (15.4%) 423 (19.2%)
Feb 86 2300 (52%) 2100 (48%) 529 (25.2%) 844 (40.2%) 323 (15.4%) 403 (19.2%)
Mar 87 2400 (52%) 2200 (48%) 554 (25.2%) 884 (40.2%) 339 (15.4%) 423 (19.2%)
Jan 88 2320 (52%) 2130 (48%) 537 (25.2%) 856 (40.2%) 328 (15.4%) 409 (19.2%)
June 88 2320 (52%) 2130 (48%) 537 (25.2%) 856 (40.2%) 328 (15.4%) 409 (19.2%)
Feb 89 2520 (52%) 2311 (48%) 582 (25.2%) 929 (40.2%) 356 (15.4%) 444 (19.2%)
Oct 89 2520 (52%) 2311 (48%) 582 (25.2%) 929 (40.2%) 356 (15.4%) 444 (19.2%)
Feb 90 2558 (52%) 2344 (48%) 591 (25.2%) 942 (40.2%) 361 (15.4%) 450 (19.2%)
Sept 90 2558 (52%) 2344 (48%) 591 (25.2%) 942 (40.2%) 361 (15.4%) 450 (19.2%)
Mar 91 2665 (53%) 2350 (47%) 592 (25.2%) 945 (40.2%) 362 (15.4%) 451 (19.2%)
Sept 91 2665 (53%) 2350 (47%) 592 (25.2%) 945 (40.2%) 362 (15.4%) 451 (19.2%)
Feb 92 2665 (53%) 2350 (47%) 592 (25.2%) 945 (40.2%) 362 (15.4%) 451 (19.2%)
Sept 92
Feb 93 2877 (53%) 2579 (47%) 650 (25.2%) 999 (38.7%) 422 (16.4%) 510 (19.8%)
Sept 93
Mar 94 2705 (53%) 2399 (47%)
Source: Sorbates – EC2
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to production capacity), disclosed the volume of their sales and
production capacity for the previous year and discussed the
‘announcement’ of new list prices. [Methionine – EC, 88]
A cartel was specifically interested in measuring the size of the avail-
able market. Given the sizable supply of firms outside of the cartel in
both sorbates and vitamin C, it was important to take this into account.
Hoechst and the four Japanese producers agreed on volume allo-
cations for sorbates sales in Europe from at least 1978. The mar-
ket was allocated in two ways. First, the producers estimated the
total demand in Europe, and then subtracted the estimated sales
volume of [non-cartel producers] Monsanto and Cheminova. The
remaining market was divided between Hoechst and the Japanese
producers. [Sorbates – EC, 106]
To set the quotas themselves, the participants first determined
the total market on the basis of their sales and estimated sales by
the Chinese and East Europeans producers of vitamin C. Expected
sales by third parties were deducted, the remainder of the market
being defined as the “available market.” Volume targets for each
producer for the next period were set on the basis of their estimate
of the “available market”. [Vitamins – EC, 393]
With regards to setting sales quotas, a general though not univer-
sal principle was to use historical precedence. In the cartel for copper
plumbing tubes: “Participants attempted to stabilise the market by
using market shares of a (previous) reference year as a basis for fixing
a target for future market shares.” [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 210]
More precisely, market shares were frozen at the level achieved in the
year(s) prior to the cartel in several cases. The organic peroxides cartel
used sales from 1969–70 to set quotas for 1971. [Organic peroxides –
EC, 85] The same approach was taken in the collusion of vitamins A
and E and of folic acid, respectively.
the underlying objective [of collusion] was to stabilize the world
market share of each producer. Market shares were frozen at 1988
levels; as the market expanded, each company could increase its
sales only in accordance with its agreed quota and in line with
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market growth and not at the expense of a competitor. [Vitamins –
EC, 164]
As with all other vitamins, the basis of the collusive arrange-
ments for folic acid was the establishment of a quota scheme.
The fundamental principle of the quota allocation scheme was
the division of the world market between Roche on the one hand
and the three Japanese producers on the other; on the basis of
achieved 1990 results, Roche was given 42%, the Japanese 58%.
The Japanese producers agreed the division amongst themselves
of their 58% quota on the basis of their respective 1990 achieved
sales performance. The annual quotas (by region) in volume terms
had to maintain the agreed 42:58 division overall, while allowing
for natural growth rate. [V-FA, 357]
In contrast, the citric acid cartel used the average of each firm’s
sales over 1988–90 to set sales quotas in 1991 [Citric acid – EC, 81]
and similarly the sorbates and zinc phosphate cartels used a multi-year
average:
Hoechst and the four Japanese producers agreed on volume allo-
cations for sorbates sales in Europe from at least 1978. The first
volume allocation for 1978 was based on their actual sales volumes
in 1977 for each region of the world, as well as current and fore-
casted demand. The corresponding volume allocation between the
Japanese producers was based on the average of their actual sales
volumes from 1973 to 1977. [Sorbates – EC, 106]
The cartel engaged in a market sharing agreement (allocation
of and adherence to market shares to/by each producer) and, to
some extent, the allocation of specific customers. The allocation of
sales quotas was the cornerstone of the cartel. Respective market
shares were initially calculated in 1994 on the basis of the figures
for the years 1991 to 1993. Each cartel member had to adhere to
its allocated market share. Sales quotas were in principle allocated
at the European level. It was thought that crucial to cooperation
is that each firm could get an accurate assessment of its market
share. [Zinc phosphate – EC, 66]
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The use of historical precedence in the setting of collusive market
shares and then the persistence of this allocation over time leads us
to claim that firm market shares are highly stable under collusion.
It is important to note that, due to changes in non-cartel supply (in
particular, growth as a result of collusion), a cartel member’s share of
the total market can change over time. What tends to be stable is a
cartel member’s share of total cartel supply.
Collusive Marker: There is a subset of firms for which each firm’s
share of total supply for that subset of firms is highly stable over time.
When the cartel is all-inclusive then this leads to the corollary:
Collusive Marker: Market shares are highly stable over time.
Before we jump to the erroneous conclusion that historical prece-
dence is universal, not all firms in all cartels were content with using
past market shares to determine the collusive allocation. A notable
example is the lysine cartel whose recent history lacked the stability
to allow historical precedence to be determining. ADM was a recent
entrant into the lysine market and it had built a large state-of-the-art
production facility. Prior to its entry, the Asian manufacturers had been
colluding so the price of lysine was relatively high. Upon entry, ADM
engaged in aggressive pricing to build market share; as a result, the
average price in the U.S. fell from $1.32/pound down to $0.68/pound.6
Once it had increased its sales to around one-third of global sales (and
it had come to dominate the U.S. market with a share of 71%), exec-
utives for ADM approached the other manufacturers about forming a
cartel. At the cartel meeting, ADM demanded parity with the largest
supplier, Ajinomoto, and proposed that the market be allocated so
that one-third went to ADM, one-third to Ajinomoto, and one-third to
Kyowa, Sewon, and Cheil. [Lysine – EC, 73, 76] In retrospect, it appears
that ADM’s strategy was to build global market share to the level that
it desired as a collusive quota and then propose the formation of a
6 Connor (2001, p. 201).
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cartel. As shown in Table 2.5, ADM’s proposal was not accepted and it
instead agreed to an allocation that gave it around 26% of global sales.
However, as part of the compromise, ADM was supposed to receive a
disproportionate share of market growth until it reached Ajinomoto’s
market share; ADM gave it three years for it to happen.
Sewon was also eventually discontent with its allocation. Though
having experienced a rise in its allocation to 37,000 tons by 1994, Sewon
wanted more. In response to Ajinomoto’s proposal that Sewon’s sale
quota be raised to 39,000 tons for 1995, Sewon instead demanded 50,000
tons. Just as ADM had made a major capacity investment and wanted
an allocation that utilized it, Sewon was building a plant in China that
would expand its capacity to 50,000 tons. [Lysine – EC, 142] Sewon later
reduced its demand to 46,000 tons. Ajinomoto responded by saying
that it would accept it if Sewon would sell 6,000 of those 40,000 tons
to Ajinomoto; Sewon declined. [Lysine – EC, 152]
A similar dilemma arose in the choline chloride cartel. After building
a new plant, Chinook demanded more share and ultimately chose to
leave the cartel: “At a meeting in 4/94, firms failed to agree to anything.
Chinook, which has recently started a new plant, would not agree to
price floors. Chinook declared it would no longer participate.” [Choline
chloride – EC, 95]
Given the recent capacity investment of ADM and Sewon, historical
precedence lacked consensus as a guide to allocating the market for
lysine. It is then interesting that, contrary to other cartels, there was a
serious effort to exchange information on capacities early in the cartel’s
life (when allocations were being agreed upon).
The participants exchanged information on ADM’s and Cheil’s
production capacity and sales volumes. Some days before the meet-
ing Cheil communicated the information on its production capacity
and sales volumes to Ajinomoto by telephone. [Lysine – EC, 63]
ADM even went so far as to engage in the unprecedented act of
inviting representatives from Ajinomoto, Kyowa, and Sewon to inspect
its production plant. Though doing so ran the risk of trade secrets
being revealed (in fact, a representative of Ajinomoto attempted to get
a sample of the microbe used by ADM in producing lysine), it was
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important for ADM to reveal the extent of its capacity and its low-cost
of production; both towards assuring that the cartel form and, in that
event, that ADM would be allocated a sufficiently large sales quota.
The exchange of capacity information is consistent with the use
of capacity to determine a market allocation. A number of historical
cartels have used such a rule including some German cartels in the
1920s and 1930s (Bloch, 1932)7 and the Norwegian cement cartel in
the mid-20th century Röller and Steen (2003).
Though stability of market shares was common, it was not universal.
In negotiating in 1992 in the market for vitamin B2, Roche agreed to
allow BASF’s market share to rise from 35% in 1990 to 38% by 1994.
[Vitamins – EC, 273] In the market for beta carotene – for which the
two suppliers were again only Roche and BASF – it was agreed in
September 1992 that:
BASF should be allowed to increase its 21% market share by 1%
a year until 2001 when it would be capped at 30%. Variations in
share were permitted from region to region provided the overall
quota was not exceeded. [Vitamins – EC, 521]
For reasons unknown, the market share allocation in the vitamin B5
cartel changed significantly over the period of 1991–99.
Table 2.7 Variation in Market Share Allocation (1991–99) – Vitamin B5
Company Global Europe
Roche 42–45% 40–48%
BASF 23–25% 19–22%
Daiichi 32–34% 30–39%
Source: Vitamins – EC, 301
One possible reason for changing market share, beyond capacity
investment (as in the lysine cartel), was due to unanticipated demand
shifts across products.
In 1994 the rapid increase in demand for vitamin E for human con-
sumption necessitated a revision of the quota allocated to Rhône-
Poulenc. To maintain its agreed 16% share of the overall market,
7 Cited in Scherer (1980).
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Rhône-Poulenc had to increase its sales in the animal feed sec-
tor. The producers agreed in August 1994 that the Rhône-Poulenc
share of the feed segment be capped at 21%; if the agreed increase
in quota in that area did not however give Rhône-Poulenc its full
16% overall, the other two European producers would purchase
product from it to compensate for the shortfall. Compensating
purchases were made by Roche in 1996 and by Roche and BASF
in 1997. [Vitamins – EC, 225]
2.2.2 Exclusive territories
As mentioned previously, sales quotas were one device for allocating
the market. Two other schemes were exclusive territories and customer
allocation, which were used both in isolation and as a method for imple-
menting sales quotas. Let us turn to examining the use of exclusive
territories.
A common principle to a number of cartels was the “home-market
principle” whereby cartel members would reduce supply in each other’s
home markets. The objective was to move to an arrangement where,
ideally, each cartel member would take control of their home market and
then share the global demand that was not part of any cartel member’s
home market. Of course, the size of some markets – such as the U.S.
and E.U. – often prevented their supply exclusively by American and
European firms, respectively, when there were other firms (often, Asian
firms) who had historically supplied those markets.8
The home-market principle is well-exemplified by the choline chlo-
ride cartel. [Choline chloride – EC, 77] The cartel was comprised of com-
panies from Europe – Akzo Nobel from the Netherlands, BASF from
Germany, and UCB from Belgium – and North America – Bio Products
and DuCoa from the U.S. and Chinook from Canada. The plan was for
European producers not to export to the North American market and
North American producers not to export to the European market. An
agreement was reached in a November 1992 meeting which specified
8 In a 1990 European Commission decision, Solvay and ICI were found to have used the
home-market principle to share the market for soda-ash, with Solvay supplying Western
Europe and ICI supplying the United Kingdom.
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that Bio Products and Chinook would be out of Western Europe by
mid-1993 and out of Eastern Europe by mid-1994 and European sup-
pliers would exit North American by mid-1993. For Asian markets,
Ducoa would reduce supply, the supply of European manufacturers
would be unchanged, and Bio Products and Chinook would expand;
while in Latin America, BASF would transfer exports from Europe to
there and the other cartel members would hold their exports at current
levels.
The home-market principle was also at work in the copper plumbing
tubes and seamless steel tubes cartels:
the basic goal of the meetings was to protect the main producers’
home markets and to freeze the market shares on the basis of the
volume figures of previous reference periods. A further objective
was to avoid price wars. [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 239]
In practice, domestic markets were reserved to the local produc-
ers in the first instance. [T]he basic rule of the agreement . . . con-
sists in observing the domestic markets of the different producers.
The United Kingdom (off-shore) was regarded as semi-protected:
a competitor had to contact the local producer of oilfield pipes
and tubes before making a bid. The Japanese producers were not
supposed to penetrate the European market in these sectors, while
European producers were not to deliver to Japan. [Seamless steel
tubes – EC, 54, 62–3]
Some firms in the lysine cartel put great emphasis on abiding by
the home-market principle:
Kyowa insisted on the home-market principle. The participants
agreed to sell, in 1991, within the export quantities of 1990. Aji-
nomoto and Kyowa requested Sewon to reduce substantially its
sales to the USA and Europe on the principle that the local pro-
ducer should sell as much as possible in its region. [Lysine – EC,
57, 68]
With the methionine industry, the home-market principle was, in
fact, the instigating factor for cartel formation.
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The cartel originated in the mid-1980s when Rhône-Poulenc and
Degussa contacted Nippon Soda and Sumitomo because they felt
that the Japanese producers’ were encroaching on ‘their’ home
markets. Rhône-Poulenc, Degussa, Nippon Soda and Sumitomo
met at divisional level and agreed a scheme to limit Japanese
imports. Some time in the 1980s, Rhône-Poulenc and Sumitomo
entered into a “gentleman’s agreement” whereby the latter would
stay out of Europe and the former would stay out of Japan.
[Methionine – EC, 82–3, 91]
It also appears that exclusive territories were used in connection
with the isostatic graphite cartel.
The three European producers were in frequent telephone contact
with each other to discuss their prices and they met at least twice
a year. The cooperation mainly included an agreement on prices to
be charged in Europe and the allocation of customers. In principle,
the German market was reserved for Ringsdorff and Schunk and
the French market for LCL. When a customer inquired about the
price for a prospective order, the three companies first contacted
each other by telephone in order to agree who would obtain that
order. [Isostatic graphite – EC, 106]
Implementation of exclusive territories may require inter-firm pur-
chases. That is, to induce a firm to pull out of a market (or greatly
reduce its supply), the home-market firm(s) may have to buy some of
that reduced supply. In the case of the nucleotides cartel, two Japanese
suppliers – Ajinomoto and Takeda – were interested in getting two
Korean suppliers – Cheil and Miwon – to limit their sales in Europe
and Japan. The deal was that Cheil and Miwon would not sell to the
three largest European buyers and would restrict supply to Japan; and
in exchange Ajinomoto and Takeda would purchase supply from them.
[Nucleotides – EC, 69]
In a competitive market, one would expect a rise in a firm’s price,
ceteris paribus, to result in more imports. However, an allocation
scheme based on the home-market principle would result in the combi-
nation of a higher price and fewer imports.
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Collusive Marker: Price increases and imports decrease.
2.2.3 Customer allocation
Finally, we turn to the scheme of allocating customers. The choline
chloride cartel used this device as well as the home-market principle to
implement the collusive allocation:
Price agreements regarding individual clients were implemented by
allocating clients to particular producers and by agreeing that the
other European producers concerned would offer higher prices than
the European producer to whom the client had been allocated.
This was done in such a way as to respect the overall market shares
in the EEA of the participating producers. Price agreement, client
allocation, and market share agreements worked hand in hand.
[Choline chloride – EC, 65]
Customer allocation was also instrumental in the copper plumbing
tubes cartel:
producers allocated a share of the respective estimated national
demand to each . . . producer. In certain markets they fixed
“extremely precise quantities” to be sold to each distributor. Thus,
customers were allocated (like distributors, for example, in the
Netherlands). In the case of allocation of customers (distributors),
the demand of certain customers was either reserved for one pro-
ducer or split between several producers. [Copper plumbing tubes –
EC, 137]
In a U.S. cartel in linen supply, firms agreed not to compete for each
other’s customers and actively assisted in ensuring that customers did
not switch. If a firm learned that one of its customers was contemplating
switching suppliers, it was to notify other cartel members who were to
submit intentionally high price quotes or refrain from submitting price
quotes.9
In the case of the district heating pipes cartel, projects were allo-
cated as part of bid-rigging.
9 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Press Release, 2/28/05.
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The cartel allocated sales quotas on both a national and European
level. ABB’s quota was 37%, Løgstør 20%, and the three other pro-
ducers 10% each. As the market is project-based, bid-rigging was a
feature. Sales managers met every 2–3 weeks to deal out contracts.
For each project, one producer was nominated “favourite” and it
informed the others what it was to bid; the others were to put
in higher “protection” offers. A computer program monitored all
bids to ensure compliance. [Competition Policy Newsletter, 1999
February, Number 1, pp. 27–8.]
There is some sketchy evidence of customer allocation in the fine
arts auction house cartel. In that cartel, there were no sales quotas
or exclusive territories, and the customer allocation that was done was
probably ad hoc or limited to especially large consignments. In this pas-
sage, Christopher Davidge and Dede Brooks are the CEOs of Christie’s
and Sotheby’s, respectively, while Stephen Lash and Christopher Burge
are employees for Christie’s.
Shortly after Davidge’s call to Brooks from Pebble Beach, Stephen
Lash was apoplectic when Christopher Burge took him aside and
asked him which estate consignment Christie’s should prefer – Mrs.
Hazen or Joanne Cummings? Without going into much further
detail, Lash recalled, Burge explained that Davidge was seeking a
“consensus.” To Lash, the clear implication was that Brooks and
Davidge were dividing up clients. As a trusts-and-estates expert
who struggled on a daily basis to ensure that major business came
to Christie’s, not Sotheby’s, he was mortified at the thought of the
firms’ two CEOs divvying up big estates on a one-for-me, one-for-
you basis.[Mason (2004, p. 191)]
A related activity to customer allocation is for firms to coordinate
on sharing a customer. A highly structured mechanism was deployed
in the electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel:
Probably because of the difficulty of implementing uniform prices
for large customers throughout Europe, SGL proposed, in a Tech-
nical Committee meeting held on 18 April 1996 in Cologne,
Germany, a second strategy, namely a policy of account leadership.
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. . . Account leadership would be determined based on the market
shares of each of the cartel members for each major customer for
the years 1994/1995. The policy was based on the following key
principles. i) The current market shares of the cartel members
should be frozen at all accounts and per each item sold where
applicable. ii) For each major customer an account leader should
be agreed, which normally should be the cartel member with the
largest share of that customer’s purchases. iii) This account leader
leads the pricing efforts, that is to say, the other members must
follow its advice before quoting a price to the customer in question.
iv) The account leader is responsible for achieving sufficient price
increases. v) Pricing for new products should be cleared with the
account leader. vi) The Summit meeting determines the account
leaders. [EMCG – EC, 128]
In settling upon a customer allocation, historical precedence seemed
to play a role as was done with the setting of sales quotas. This
was noted for the nucleotides cartel where the three largest European
buyers were allocated between Ajinomoto and Takeda according to
who had historically supplied them. [Nucleotides – EC, 68] This was
also used in the vitamin C cartel which furthermore showed how
special arrangements could be made to handle large customers such as
Coca-Cola.
To underpin their concerted efforts to raise the price for vitamin C
in each market, the producers conceived a sophisticated system for
handling the ‘key accounts’, i.e. important individual customers
for which a detailed sales plan would be agreed. For each ‘key
customer’ which is identified, the producers estimated its total
annual demand and reported the price it was currently paying,
ascertained whether this was under a tonnage or fixed-term con-
tract and agreed who would supply what tonnage in 1991. In some
cases a producer asserted the right to supply exclusively a partic-
ular ‘traditional’ customer; in others, it demanded that the busi-
ness of that customer be split according to a particular set formula.
One of the largest customers worldwide was Coca-Cola whose total
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requirements of vitamin C are in excess of 1,000 tonnes per year.
For this major account, which received special treatment, Coca-
Cola negotiated a worldwide supply contract with its suppliers, the
vitamin producers agreed between themselves how the business
would be shared between them and the prices quoted. The car-
tel also discussed the supply contracts which Roche had with the
pharmaceutical company Pfizer. This contract was renewed every
two years. Takeda’s report of its meeting with Roche in February
1993 read as follows: Roche would like Takeda not to supply Pfizer
if they contact Takeda. [Vitamins – EC, 402–12]
In the zinc phosphate cartel, the largest customer in the market –
the Finnish company Teknos – was shared among the cartel members
by having the contract rotate among them.
in order to avoid a price war over Teknos, it was agreed that Bri-
tannia, Heubach, SNCZ, and Waardals would take it in turns to
supply this customer. The supplier for the next period was dis-
cussed at each meeting. [Zinc phosphate – EC, 97]
It is also noteworthy that the cartel was cognizant that Teknos
might suspect that the firms were coordinating.
the companies were aware that Teknos could become suspicious
of the collusion . . . if a regular rotation was put in place. The
cartel participants . . . therefore followed a more flexible system, for
example, at one stage SNCZ was the Teknos’ designated supplier
three times in succession. [Zinc phosphate – EC, 100]
2.2.4 Other allocation issues
As mentioned earlier, firms did not always agree on the allocation. It
is also true that they did not always agree on the allocation scheme.
In the lysine cartel, Ajinomoto and Sewon argued in favor of exclusive
territories and Sewon proposed that the Japanese firm Kyowa be given a
monopoly in Japan. (Though Ajinomoto was the largest lysine producer
and was Japanese, its primary market was Europe through its division
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Eurolysine.) ADM preferred sales quotas and, in particular, argued
against a customer allocation scheme:
Wilson [of ADM] told the cartel that volume limitations did not
mean dividing up the market by captive consumers and refuse
to sell to others. A “don’t touch [each other’s] customers policy”
could create suspicions. The cartel had agreed, upon the urging
of Wilson, not to permanently assign customers because it would
have been too obvious. [Lieber (2000, pp. 184–238)]
Sewon, however, was against having sales quotas as it felt that
a firm’s allocation should be based on its previous year’s sales. (Of
course, that is exactly the time of arrangement that would result in
firms overproducing.) Eventually, the lysine producers agreed to allo-
cate the global market using sales quotas.
A similar view to that of Sewon was voiced by Japanese suppliers
Chisso and Ueno in the sorbates cartel, though Japanese supplier Daicel
agreed with Hoechst.
Chisso declared that the volume quotas system should be abolished
since it prevented the producers of increasing their sales. Ueno
shared Chisso’s view. Daicel wanted to maintain the status quo and
wanted to prevent members from leaving the group. It supported
Hoechst’s proposal . . . against abolishing the quotas. [Sorbates –
EC2, 206]
These disparate views regarding the allocation scheme may be due
to honest differences as to what was thought to be the most effective
collusive mechanism. There may be different opinions as which scheme
is easier to monitor or less likely to create suspicions among buyers that
there is collusion. Alternatively, these different views may be strategic
and reflect dissatisfaction with the likely allocation that a particular
allocation scheme would induce. For example, a firm may argue against
sales quotas because it expects that quotas will be set based on sales
in preceding years and it may desire a bigger share of the market.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that not all cartels had an
allocation scheme. There is no direct evidence that the methionine
cartel had a volume agreement. The European Commission concluded
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that: “The cartel’s three main objectives were to fix target prices, agree
[to] concerted price increases and share information on sales volumes
and market shares.” [Methionine – EC, 64]. Though cartel member
Degussa proposed the establishment of a volume agreement, it con-
tends it was never implemented. [Methionine – EC, 75] Furthermore,
Degussa believed that such a scheme would not have worked because
a major supplier, Monsanto/Novus, was not a member of the cartel.
[Methionine – EC, 149] The methionine cartel focused on coordinating
their prices and, in spite of exchanging firm sales volume, apparently
did not use this information to implement a market allocation scheme.
Another case in which there was not a market allocation was the
lysine cartel in its early years. In fact, this case argues to the impor-
tance of agreeing to quantity and not just price. As described earlier,
the lysine producers disagreed as to the preferred allocation scheme –
some wanted exclusive territories, while others wanted sales quotas –
and this disagreement initially resulted in there being no allocation
agreement though firms did come to an agreement on price. Starting in
November 1992, price initially rose to $0.98/pound in spite of the lack
of an allocation agreement. But by March 1993 the price agreement had
unravelled and price was down to $0.68/pound (Connor, 2001). After
this failed start, firms went back to working out an allocation agree-
ment which they did achieve in late 1993. From that point onward,
collusion was highly effective.
The importance of a quantity agreement was clearly stated by an
executive connected to the copper plumbing tubes cartel. When asked
why cartel members chose to fix market shares rather than price, the
executive replied: “if there was allocation of volumes, prices would
follow.” [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 220]
3
How is a Collusive Outcome Enforced?
Having coordinated on price and/or an allocation of the market, the
agreement must then be implemented. In doing so, there is the concern
that cartel members may cheat by pricing too low, selling too much,
attracting other firms’ customers, and committing other violations of
the understanding among firms. Towards deterring such cheating, car-
tel members’ behavior was monitored and, if there was a significant
deviation from the agreed-upon outcome, the deviator was punished
and the harmed firms were possibly compensated.1 Issues of monitor-
ing and punishment are reviewed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
In addition to internal difficulties associated with implementation, car-
tels were concerned with external disruptions coming from those not
part of the cartel. This will typically mean non-cartel suppliers; either
manufacturers of the product who are not part of the cartel or firms
who purchase the product from the cartel as an input and resell it or
add value to it. There was also an internal source of disruption in the
form of employees who are involved in sales activities – typically, sales
1 According to the theory of collusive pricing, punishment not compensation is critical.
However, these case studies reveal an importance attached to compensation.
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representatives – but were not privy to the collusion that was taking
place. These issues are covered in Section 3.3.
3.1 Monitoring
Collecting information on other firms’ prices and sales is a non-trivial
exercise. Though price lists were often public information, one of the
concerns was that a cartel member may be giving secret discounts off
of that list to buyers. Since, in most of these markets, price could be
bilaterally set between a seller and a buyer, there is the issue of how
a firm learns what other firms are really charging. The matter may
be even more difficult when it comes to data on sales. Some informa-
tion could be retrieved by learning from a customer as to from whom
they bought. However, on the whole, cartels relied on the self-reporting
of sales data which raises the issue about the incentives to truthfully
report. Indeed, there were documented episodes of deception but firms
were not naive on the matter and some cartels instituted methods to
check the authenticity of the reported numbers.
3.1.1 Monitoring of price
Though far greater effort was put into monitoring sales, let me begin
by discussing the monitoring of price. This is obviously necessary when
there is no volume agreement but is also useful when there is one. In
the electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products cartel, it
was noted that: “There were exchanges of price information regard-
ing specific bids for tenders. They also exchanged the cartel members’
turnover to individual clients along with the price level obtained in
those sales.” [EMCG – EC2, 142] While the copper plumbing tubes
performed “continuous price co-ordination through regular adaptation
of price lines (mostly by phone) and agreements on rebates.” [Copper
plumbing tubes – EC, 212]
Firms were also able to engage in some unilateral monitoring of price
and thus avoid relying exclusively on self-reporting. A firm’s sales force
could be useful for learning about competitors’ prices. Some firms in the
industrial and medical gases cartel instructed their sale representatives
to report any aggressive pricing by competitors. [IMG – EC1, 161]
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Also, one of the cartel members of the plasterboard cartel noted: “Our
sales team give us daily information about our competitors’ prices.”
[Plasterboard – EC, 342] With the sorbates cartel, dealers were a source
of information:
Hoechst and the Japanese producers monitored target price adher-
ence through the data regarding competitor pricing which they
used to receive through their dealers. When prices fell below the
target prices for key customers, the Japanese companies (mainly
Daicel) and Hoechst did on occasions telephone each other to try to
ensure that such prices were brought closer into line with the tar-
gets in the next large contract with the same customer. [Sorbates –
EC2, 113]
To show its compliance, a firm may also share with other cartel
members the instructions they have given to employees with regards to
pricing. This is particularly important for the fine arts auction house
cartel since there is limited evidence of a market allocation scheme.
To demonstrate that Sotheby’s was “following suit”, [an officer
of Sotheby’s] faxed Christie’s with a copy of internal instructions
given to staff confirming the strict new practice: all commissions
are minimum rates and may not be waived or reduced. The instruc-
tions made clear that the new tariffs would be non-negotiable.
[FA – EC, 112]
So as to avoid any mistaken inferences about cheating as well as to
deter cheating, Christie’s and Sotheby’s also shared the list of clients to
which they had already signed contracts so that it was understood that
the commission rates charged were negotiated prior to the collusive
agreement. If the client was not on that list then an auction house
was in violation of the agreement if it did not charge the agreed-upon
commission rate.
Both press releases of Christie’s and Sotheby’s made it clear that
property already consigned for future planned sales would not
be affected by the new sliding commission scales. This obvious
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exception however opened the door to “cheating” by the two auc-
tion houses. In order to ensure that neither took on new business
at the old rates or at no commission, the [companies] exchanged
lists of “grandfathered” clients. These lists identified the customers
with whom conditions had been agreed, prior to the announcement
of the new scale. [FA – EC, 117]
3.1.2 Monitoring of sales
3.1.2.1 Structure of reporting
To most cartels, more critical than monitoring price was monitoring
sales. The level of specificity of sales data that was collected varied
greatly across cartels. Of course, the need for such numbers depended
on the allocation scheme. An attraction to a customer allocation scheme
is that monitoring is relatively easy since, if a firm was to supply a
particular buyer, it would surely know whether that buyer ended up
buying from someone else. Monitoring a sales quota scheme was more
difficult and indeed most of the information from these cases about
monitoring pertains to it.
Perhaps the most sophisticated and well-documented monitoring
scheme was that deployed in the vitamins cartel. The “budget” in the
vitamins cartel refers to the sales quotas.2
The collusive arrangements in most of the vitamins concerned
employed essentially the same model and followed the same pat-
tern and the same method of operation, namely: the preparation,
agreement and implementation and monitoring of an annual ‘bud-
get’, the exchange of sales, volume and pricing information on a
quarterly or monthly basis, the adjustment of actual sales achieved
so as to comply with the quotas allocated in the ‘budget’ exercise,
the establishment of formal structure and hierarchy of different
levels of management, often with overlapping membership at the
most senior levels, the role of Roche as the conduit for collusion
with Japanese producers. [Vitamins – EC, 577]
2 For more details, see Connor (2001).
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Here is some evidence from specific vitamins cartels:
For the most part, the BASF documents consist of (a) worksheets
or support documents used to fix the annual budget for each pro-
ducer on a country-by-country basis and (b) charts comparing the
actual sales of each producer with their respective budgeted vol-
umes., i.e. their quota for each regional and national market both
on an annual basis and for interim periods (sales figures in volumes
were exchanged on a monthly basis). [Vitamins (A, E) – EC, 191]
The purpose of the quarterly meetings was to monitor achieved
market shares against quota and to adjust sales levels to comply
with the agreed allocations. A control system along the lines of
the vitamin A and E mechanism was developed. [Vitamins (B2) –
EC, 276]
Results were to be monitored on a quarterly basis against tar-
get quotas . . .. There were comprehensive spreadsheets and tables
showing how the sales quotas were calculated for each year and
how actual sales (‘result’) were compared with quota (‘allocation’).
[Vitamins (folic acid) – EC, 359]
This was not unique to the vitamins cartel; the overall structure
of monitoring was quite common to cartels with an allocation scheme,
especially one based on sales quotas. For consider the plasterboard
cartel:
At these meetings, the competing undertakings exchanged data
on their market shares with a view to reaching agreement on the
sharing of the German market. BPB, Knauf and Lafarge regularly
exchanged sales volumes data, inter alia on the German market,
and that from 1995 onwards, this regular exchange took place on
a quarterly basis. The representatives of BPB and Knauf estab-
lished, as from 1992, information exchange arrangements, to which
Lafarge and subsequently Gyproc acceded, relating to their sales
volumes on the German, French, UK and Benelux plasterboard
markets; the representatives of BPB, Knauf and Lafarge exchanged
information, on various occasions, prior to price increases on the
UK market. [Plasterboard – EC, 462]
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Another highly developed monitoring scheme was that used in the
graphite electrodes cartel with the institution of their “Central Moni-
toring System.”
In addition to discussions on pricing and on certain customers, the
participants exchanged information on their individual sales vol-
umes covering several years: the previous year, current year and
projections for the coming year. Volume data for all areas, includ-
ing Europe, were updated and revised at each meeting. Information
was broken down by country for each firm with the Japanese being
one group. For the purpose of formalising the exchange of volume
information and making the collection of data more efficient, SGL
proposed at the ‘Top Guy’ meeting in Tokyo in February 1995
the adoption of a ‘Central Monitoring System’ (CMS). Tokai was
designated by the cartel to collect the data from the Japanese
producers, UCAR and SGL. [Graphite electrodes – EC, 55]
Previously we mentioned that the allocation of (European) mar-
ket shares in the sorbates cartel was set in two stages. At the general
cartel meeting, the market was allocated between Hoechst and the four
Japanese producers. Afterwards, the Japanese members would meet
to divvy up their share amongst themselves. This organization also
applied to the monitoring arrangement.
As for volume quotas, before preparatory meetings, Daicel used to
collect sales information from each of the Japanese producers and
to prepare charts reflecting this information. During the prepara-
tory meetings, the Japanese producers monitored sales results for
the year to date and compared them to the agreed volume quo-
tas for the same period. At the joint meeting, the group reviewed
sales results and confirmed the volume allocations agreed in the
previous joint meeting. [Sorbates – EC, 114]
The lysine cartel was also highly organized.
Kanji Mimoto of Ajinomoto was assigned the task of preparing
monthly “scorecards” for the five members of the cartel as a way of
tracking adherence to the volume shares agreed upon. Each month,
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the five companies telephoned or mailed their lysine volumes of
sales to Mimoto, who prepared a running spreadsheet that was
handed out and discussed at the quarterly maintenance meetings.
Sales volumes were calculated for four regions (North America,
Latin America, Europe/Middle East/Africa and Asia/Oceania)
and for the world. [Connor (2001, p. 207)]
Based on this information, the cartel would decide whether or not
firms were compliant.
The participants compared the allocated production quotas for
1994 with the actual sales figures realized during the same year.
They concluded that the difference between allocated quota and
actual sales of each company was not excessive and that therefore
the price level could be maintained. Furthermore the participants
resolved to allocate sales quotas on the basis of the estimated mar-
ket size for 1995. [Lysine – EC, 154]
What happens when a firm’s sales exceeds its quota and other firms
fall short of theirs will be considered in Section 3.2.
3.1.2.2 Level of aggregation
As reflected in the lysine cartel, there were various levels of aggregation
in reporting. It might be at the global level, regional level, country level,
or even at the level of specific customers. For example, the vitamins
cartel tended to report at the regional level.
Regional product marketing level – These meetings, which were
organised by the regional management and involved the heads
of marketing for each region, including Europe, were held about
four times a year. Discussions included pricing to individual cus-
tomers. The group was also responsible for: monitoring sales
against budget on a regional level and making adjustments if neces-
sary; identifying relevant market developments inside their region;
implementing the price increases agreed at the more senior levels.
[Vitamins (A, E) – EC, 176]
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A document dated 5 June 1991 is headed “Vitamin B1 moni-
toring 1990” and shows for each region (Northern America, Latin
America, Japan, Europe, etc.) the sales in tonnes of Roche, BASF,
Takeda and the Chinese producers, the latter presumably esti-
mated for the year 1990. [Vitamins – EC, 249]
The isostatic graphite cartel held meetings at the local level and
reported sales at the more disaggregated country level in response to
dissatisfaction with the cartel’s performance in terms of price increases.
the meeting was convened with the object of improving the
implementation of decisions and the communication among man-
ufacturers. Price increases were not showing good progress . . . The
participants therefore decided to monitor better the sales chan-
nels and the prices by taking further control of local agents. Local
meetings would thus be held in Germany, France, Italy and Spain,
with SGL being appointed as coordinator for Germany, LCL for
France and Spain and Tokai for Italy. . . . Tokai explains that it was
deemed necessary to have meetings where the situation could be
assessed on a country-by-country basis because the representatives
at the European meetings were not able to obtain sufficient infor-
mation on specific local circumstances.[Isostatic graphite – EC,
202, 237]
The choline chloride cartel – which used sales quotas, exclusive terri-
tories, and customer allocation – exchanged highly disaggregated sales
data.
In the EEA, whether the agreed market shares, customer allo-
cations and prices were being achieved in practice was regularly
checked by comparing information on sales actually made dur-
ing the previous period. Starting from CEFIC [trade association]
statistics, participants would report their actual sales volumes and
sales prices in national markets, including to individual customers.
They also discussed their experiences with individual customers.
The parties agreed to meet every six months to monitor, discuss
and correct any problems. In these follow-up meetings, the par-
ties compared information on sales actually made during the last
period. [Choline chloride – EC, 69]
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3.1.2.3 Accuracy of reported sales
As the cartel largely relied upon firms self-reporting their sales, there
is obviously a concern about underreporting. A firm may either inten-
tionally or inadvertently overproduce but in either case it may want to
underreport in order to avoid punishment. As the incentive compatibil-
ity of truthful reporting is problematic, a central issue is the accuracy
of the reported sales.
In cartels such as carbonless paper and lysine, there is evidence that
firms acted “as if” these reported numbers were accurate even though
firms might suspect underreporting.
Comparison of these figures with information on real sales fig-
ures confirms that the sales volume information exchanged at the
meeting was accurate. This shows that the carbonless paper pro-
ducers took the information exchange seriously. Mougeot’s state-
ment indicates that the volume information exchanged was used
to verify whether there were important changes in market shares,
which might be due to a failure to comply with the price increase
agreements. [Carbonless paper – EC, 248]
In the Plasterboard cartel, some cartel members were suspicious
that its fellow members were underreporting but then an audit was
permitted.
According to Gyproc, the time came when Mr [K], [a high level
representative], realised that its competitors were not always sup-
plying the consultancy with accurate figures, in order, according
to Gyproc, to minimise the volume of their sales on the German
market and hence reduce their share of that market. In this way
they made their competitors overestimate their own market shares.
[Plasterboard – EC, 214]
in the French market meeting . . . there was some disagreement
between the cartel members on the accuracy of price increase and
volume information exchanged in the course of the meeting. In
order to verify the figures submitted, [an AWA employee], who
doubted the figures supplied by Sarrió (Torraspapel), had asked
and received permission to audit the information on Sarrió’s sales
volumes on Sarrió’s premises. [Plasterboard – EC, 106]
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The sorbates cartel was rather unique in that Japanese export data
provided a check on the sales being reported by the Japanese producers.
the group started noticing the existence of “grey material” –
which corresponded to the difference between the self-declared
sales results and the published Japanese export data. This “grey
material” was due to the fact that the producers did not report
all of their sales results to the group. The self-declared figures
were not verified and the group assumed that the Japanese export
data was accurate [and therefore the discrepancy was due to
the producers not reporting their sales accurately]. Hoechst was
always aware of the Japanese export statistics because it was a
member of the Chemical Industrial Products Export Co-operative
(CIPEC), a Japanese organised export cartel that had no rela-
tionship with the conspiracy, and, consequently, had access to
the Japanese export statistics. The Japanese producers, however,
had no way of checking the Hoechst sales figures since they could
not obtain the German official statistical data. [Sorbates – EC2,
191]
Due to the incentive to misreport, some cartels actively sought
independent verification including vitamins, plasterboard, and citric
acid.
They again discussed the mechanism needed to obtain and police
a sales volume agreement. ADM stated that the way for them
to communicate is through a trade association. ADM explained
by way of example that ADM reported its citric acid sales every
month to a trade association, and every year, Swiss accountants
audited those figures.” [Lysine – EC, 100]
But even with independent auditing, cartel members might be able
to “hide” sales and once again result in underreporting.
A memo from 1/94 revealed that Ajinomoto parked 3,500 tons of
lysine out of the cartel’s auditors. Another sentence read: “Hide
1,000 tons in Thailand internal business.” [Lieber (2000, p. 172)]
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Cheil claims that, whenever it submitted data on sales vol-
umes, such data were continuously incorrect as they understated
its actual sales. Cheil stresses that in fact it supplied misleading
information to the other companies. [Lysine – EC, 375]
At the same time, the lysine cartel seemed to take these numbers
seriously, which suggests that there were perceived to be limits to the
extent of misreporting: “The cartel was pleased at its Atlanta meeting
in 1/95 because there was only ‘a very small difference between what
was allocated and what was sold.” ’ [Lieber (2000, p. 234)]
Some cartels went through a series of reporting procedures with the
apparent intent to improve the accuracy of the sales numbers. The cop-
per plumbing tubes cartel went from self-reporting to working through
the International Wrought Copper Council (IWCC), which is a trade
association, to using the World Bureau of Metal Statistics.
The main part of the cooperation was the exchange of sales vol-
umes data and, on its basis, the allocation of volume quotas.
Volumes were first exchanged through the “spreadsheets;” each
producer provided Mr. [. . .] with its volume figures of deliveries
on a country-by-country basis on a monthly or quarterly basis
and, with these figures, Mr. [. . .] prepared a “spreadsheet” that
contained the collected data. From around 1993, IWCC data was
used as a basis for agreeing on volume-targets until at least mid
1994; sales volume data of each main market was submitted to
the market leader, normally on a monthly basis. In 1996, certain
data was exchanged directly among the parties to re-intensify car-
tel activities as they had occurred before. In 1997, participants
set up a new data exchange system – initially on a monthly, later
on a quarterly, basis through the World Bureau of Metal Statis-
tics. WBMS statistics only contained aggregated figures and no
company specific information. [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 486]
Interestingly, two cartels designed the monitoring scheme in order to
protect the privacy of each firm’s market share while constructing total
market sales for dissemination. In this way, each firm could calculate
only its own market share. The isostatic graphite cartel achieved this
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by playing “pass the calculator,” while the plasterboard used a third
party.
A common practice in the meeting . . . consisted in trying to deter-
mine the size of the market by passing around a calculator where
each participant entered its company’s sales volumes of isostatic
products. This ensured that no one saw the individual companies’
volumes, but only aggregate sales to the Italian market. [Isostatic
graphite – EC, 245]
Four firms set up a system for exchanging information through
an independent expert, Mr [U, independent consultant]. The oper-
ation was placed under the aegis of the Plasterboard Industry
Group. Each producer gave its figure to Mr [U] on a confidential
basis and the results were compiled by the latter’s office, giving an
aggregate figure, which was then sent to the participants. This fig-
ure enabled each producer to calculate its own market share, but
not that of the others. Every quarter, the participants – Gyproc,
Rigips, Knauf/Dano and Lafarge – supplied their respective sales
figures (in square metres) to Mr [U], who collated them and then
sent each an aggregate figure for the whole market. [Plasterboard –
EC, 271]
It is unclear why firms sought to maintain privacy of their market
share and to what extent effective enforcement could be achieved with-
out market shares being commonly known among the cartel members.
3.1.2.4 Frequency of reporting
In addition to the level of disaggregation, another important dimension
to monitoring schemes was the frequency with which firms exchanged
sales data and assessed compliance. This issue is reviewed in more detail
in Section 4 and there it is shown that the frequency of monitoring
ranged from weekly communication via phone or fax to semi-annual
face-to-face meetings.
The copper plumbing tubes cartel only appeared to exchange sales
data every several months:
For the purpose of stabilising the market shares, the participating
companies usually met around October/November to discuss the
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size of the relevant market and to agree on target volumes. Market
shares and volume information were exchanged a few times a year
and followed by meetings, usually at the operational level. [Copper
plumbing tubes – EC, 200]
The choline chloride cartel reported that it initially was set up to
meet semi-annually though actually communicated by phone about
every 2–3 weeks to discuss sales in Europe. [Choline chloride – EC,
97] Quite typical was for cartels to meet and share sales data on a
quarterly or monthly basis. In the case of the vitamin B5 cartel, firms
initially reported sales data on a quarterly basis but later chose to do
it on a monthly basis. [Vitamins – EC, 316]
The lysine, zinc phosphate, and citric acid cartels monitored on a
regular monthly basis.
In order to monitor the correct implementation of these quotas
and avoid, as far as possible, the need for compensation at the
end of each year, a regular exchange of monthly sales information
was established from March 1991 (37). As Jungbunzlauer declares,
‘each of the participants reported the tonnage they had sold in each
region (Europe, North America, and the rest of the world) to the
secretariat of the ECAMA President by the seventh (day) of each
month. In the secretariat these sales figures were assembled and
then reported back to the members by telephone, broken down by
firm and by region. This made it possible to monitor the relative
market shares continuously. The information also formed the basis
of the market analysis carried out at the meetings. [Citric acid –
EC, 100]
While the vitamins A and E cartel met monthly for monitoring
purposes, they communicated weekly by phone.
The managers who attended the European regional meetings had
weekly telephone contact in order to monitor the agreements on
pricing and sales volumes and to discuss individual customers.
Every month they exchanged the volumes of vitamins A and E
sold in each national market. Roche provided the others with the
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monthly sales of Eisai in the European market as a whole rather
than for each country. [Vitamins – EC, 188]
Though monitoring might take place weekly or monthly, the pun-
ishment for non-compliance was levied annually. By engaging in high-
frequency monitoring, a number of these cartels – such as citric acid,
lysine, and vitamins A and E – gave firms the opportunity to adjust
their sales so as to be compliant at the year’s end with respect to
sales quotas. This would avoid the need for actually implementing a
punishment.
3.1.2.5 Other monitoring issues
Some cartels would choose to work through their trade association.
In this quotation from the European Commission decision on the zinc
phosphate cartel, CEFIC and VdMI refer to trade associations.
In order to ensure that allocated market shares were adhered to, a
monitoring system was set up. Each producer sent its sales volumes
data on a monthly basis to the CEFIC and later to the VdMI,
which compiled the figures and sent them to all the five producers
concerned. Being in possession of the exact size of the market, the
producers met and provided each other with their individual sales
volumes, thereby verifying via this exchange of information their
mutual adherence to the agreed market shares. Information about
specific customers was also exchanged. On some occasions, this
resulted in customer allocation. [Zinc phosphate – EC, 69]
Finally, it is worth noting that firms were not always reliant on
other firms self-reporting. In some instances, unilateral monitoring of
customers provided information.
Gas suppliers are rather well informed about each other’s clients.
Because cylinders and gas tanks usually belong to the gas supplier
and bear that company’s markings, a salesman visiting a customer
or a potential customer can easily see who the current supplier
is. A supplier can therefore react immediately if a customer with
which it has a contract starts buying from a competitor. The larger
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suppliers of industrial gases certainly maintain lists for each com-
petitor detailing customers they have lost and won. These lists
also indicate price concessions they had to accept because of com-
petitive offers made by that particular competitor. [Industrial and
medical gases – EC, 83]
3.2 Enforcement
Suppose a firm was found to have priced below the agreed-upon price
or sold significantly in excess of their sales quota. What was the pun-
ishment that would ensue? The review of these cases reveal two types
of reactions to apparent violations. For some of the cartels with allo-
cation schemes, they instituted a well-structured compensation scheme
whereby either: i) a firm that sold too much had to buy output from
a firm that sold too little; or ii) the next year’s sales quotas were
adjusted accordingly. A second reaction was to engage in aggressive
pricing behavior. There is evidence that this was discussed and threat-
ened but one would need to examine the price data to see if it was ever
executed. Typically, though not universally, the threatened aggression
would be targeted at the markets and customers of the deviator. It
should also be noted that the threat of a price war (or the collapse of
collusion) may have served to induce firms to go along with a compen-
sation scheme.
3.2.1 Buy-backs and compensation
Some form of compensation was used in the cartels in the markets for
choline chloride, citric acid, lysine, organic peroxides, sodium gluconate,
sorbates, most vitamins, and zinc phosphate. The scheme was well-
developed in the citric acid cartel and is somewhat canonical for this
type of punishment/compensation scheme.
A compensation scheme was agreed to as a corollary to the quota
agreement and in order to penalise those companies selling above
their assigned sales quota and at the same time compensate those
that did not reach it. If a company went over its assigned quota
in any one year, it would be obliged to purchase product from the
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company or companies with sales below their quota during the
following year. [Citric acid – EC, 88]
At the meeting on 14 November 1991 in Brussels, the first at
which sufficient data had been gathered on the progress of sales,
it became clear that ADM was falling far short of its sales quota
whilst Haarmann & Reimer was ahead of its quota by a similar
quantity: ‘By the end of 1991, Haarmann & Reimer needed to
buy 7,000 tons of citric acid from ADM’. The other two producers
were broadly in line with their quotas. At the meeting concern was
expressed on this divergence because it had been agreed that one
of the aims of the meticulous monitoring of sales was precisely to
avoid the need for any compensation at the end of the year. It had
been agreed earlier that imbalances of this kind were not to be
allowed. [Citric acid – EC, 102]
This form of compensation was also part of the choline chloride
cartel’s agreement.
it was understood that Akzo Nobel and UCB could claim 35%
and 28% respectively, while BASF would have 15%. The principle
was accepted that compensation should be provided if these shares
were exceeded. [Choline chloride – EC, 99]
It is noteworthy that cartels actively sought to avoid the necessity
of buy-backs. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the citric acid and vitamins
A and E cartels engaged in “continuous monitoring” to assess how sales
matched up with quotas and, where a firm was at a pace to sell too
much by the year’s end, the firm was expected to slow down their sales.
The information for the whole year was maintained on a cumu-
lative monthly basis to ensure that each party kept to its agreed
market share; if one was seen to be selling more than its allocated
quota, it would have to “slow down” sales to enable the others to
catch up. If at the end of the year a producer was substantially
ahead of its quota, it had to purchase vitamins from the others in
order to compensate them for the corresponding shortfall in their
allocation. [Vitamins (A, E) – EC, 196]
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One conjecture for the effort exerted to avoid buy-backs is that firms
were uncertain as to whether they would actually be made. If indeed a
firm that had oversold did not make compensation, it could cause the
cartel to collapse. On this point, recall that, at one point during the
citric acid cartel, Haarman & Reimer was to buy 7,000 tons from ADM.
Haarmann & Reimer was reluctant to compensate ADM.
Hoffmann-La Roche’s World Head of Marketing Vitamins and
Fines Chemicals, as Chairman, intervened in the dispute, mak-
ing it clear that this was an essential part of the agreement and
that non-compliance on this point would undermine the trust nec-
essary to maintain the cartel and would therefore be harmful to
all participants. Accordingly, he urged Haarmann & Reimer to ful-
fil its agreement. The representatives of ADM and Haarmann &
Reimer were told to work out a solution to this dispute and they
discussed the subject at a subsequent bilateral meeting. [Citric
acid – EC, 103]
Ultimately, it did make the compensation. While an executive for
Haarman & Reimer claimed that “.. compensation never exceeded 2%
of its total global sales.” [CA, 111], even 2% of global sales is non-trivial.
It could also have been that regular and large inter-firm purchases may
have created suspicions about collusion, though such purchases can be
done for legitimate purposes as well. For both these reasons, it would
make sense for cartel members to strenuously avoid the necessity of
having to engage in inter-firm sales.
ADM used this compensation scheme not only in the citric acid
cartel but also with the lysine cartel.
Wilson [of ADM] described guaranteed “buy-ins” whereby if one
sold more then their quota, it would have to buy product from
producers who were below quota. Mimoto [of Ajinomoto] explained
it in court: “We had allocation for each company at the end of the
year 1994. If some company exceeded the allocated quantity and if
some company is behind the allocated quantity, then the exceeding
company must buy lysine from the behind-schedule company.” The
five companies provided sales figures to Mimoto. When ADM’s
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sales fell behind the schedule, the other producers slowed down
so that ADM could catch up and meet its quota. [Lieber (2000,
p. 148)]
In the organic peroxides cartel, buy-backs were not presented as
something compulsory but rather that it was an option to a firm to
request it when it sold below quota.
All future sales of initiators in the geographical area will be shared
between the parties in accordance with a quota system . . . the
quota will be maintained by exchanging every quarter the uncer-
tified sales figures of the past three months . . . If the exchange
of figures shows that the sales of a party in any country have
exceeded the quota for any category then that party will modify
its sales policy in succeeding months with the object of arriving
eventually at a tonnage for the whole of the calendar year which
does not exceed his percentage quota . . . compensation may be
made at the underseller’s discretion by the purchase of product/s
at prices which reflect the loss of profit suffered by the underseller.
[Organic peroxides – EC, 2, 85]
The organic peroxides cartel was explicit that the buy-back was
done for purposes of compensation as it was to reflect the firms’ fore-
gone profit. This suggests that compensation may have been a more
significant consideration than punishment. Indeed, if a deviating firm
is only required to “return excessive sales” than it is not much of a pun-
ishment at all. What may then have been the case is that the buy-back
scheme was indeed to serve the purpose of compensation and, so as
to ensure that buy-backs were paid, there was the threat of aggressive
pricing, which we discuss below.3
Collusive Marker: In the previous period, firm i sells above its his-
torical market share and firm j sells below its historical market share
3 Such a mechanism is consistent with the theoretical analysis of Harrington and Skrzypacz
(2005). There it is shown that when firms only observe other firms’ sales but not their
prices, the threat of a price war cannot by itself sustain collusion. However, a buy-back
scheme supported by the threat of a price war can sustain collusion.
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and, in the current period, there are large purchases by firm i from
firm j.
A modification of this buy-back scheme was used in the soda ash
cartel though there it was one-sided. Solvay sought to “buy” the cooper-
ation of rival CFK by guaranteeing CFK a minimum supply. If CFK’s
sales fell below that minimum then Solvay would purchase the dif-
ference from CFK. Interestingly, when the market grew faster than
expected, CFK expected its minimum sales to rise with it. Thus, the
agreement was apparently not in terms of volume but market share.
Originally, CFK’s guarantee was set at 179,000 tonnes, a figure
apparently based on CFK’s achieved sales in Germany during 1986.
For both 1987 and 1988, CFK’s achieved sales were somewhat
over its guaranteed minimum of 179,000 tonnes (183,000 tonnes
and 180,000 tonnes respectively). Indeed demand in Germany had
started to increase beyond earlier expectations and by the end of
1988 it had become apparent that the total sales for that year
would come to some 1,170,000 tonnes, an increase of some 8.3%
over the previous year. As a result of the growth in demand, CFK
demanded a minimum guarantee for 1988 and 1989 of 194,000
tonnes. Solvay offered maximum compensation for 1988 of 4,000
tonnes instead of the 8,500 tonnes. For 1989, it proposed that the
guarantee be . . . 190,000 tonnes instead of the 194,000 tonnes which
CFK had originally demanded. [Soda ash – EC, 42–48]
A closely related alternative to buy-backs is to adjust the next year’s
sales quotas based on the relationship between the current year’s sales
and quotas. In the sodium gluconate cartel, if a firm’s sales exceeded
its quota then its quota in the ensuing year would be reduced.4,5
Though a buy-back scheme was originally instituted in the sorbates
cartel, it was then abandoned for unknown reasons.
4 “Commission Fines Five Companies in Sodium Gluconate Cartel.” European Commission
Press Release, March 19, 2002.
5 The dependence of the current market allocation on past realized allocations is a feature
of a collusive mechanism characterized in Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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Among the Japanese producers there was a penalty system in the
early years of the agreements. In 1981, for instance, Daicel com-
pelled Chisso to buy 60 to 70 tons from Daicel because Chisso
had exceeded its volume quota for 1980. The penalty system was
abandoned after 1981, at Chisso’s request. [Sorbates – EC2, 116]
An alternative form of compensation for having sold under a quota
was to receive a bigger customer allocation. This was used in the zinc
phosphate cartel.
The agreement on sales and quotas was in the nature of a ‘gentle-
men’s agreement’, in that the members did not put into practice
any specific kind of enforcement mechanism. Enforcement of the
sales quotas was achieved through pressure brought to bear on the
members during cartel meetings. Customer allocation was used
as a form of compensation in the event of a company not having
achieved its allocated quota. On an annual basis, the real market
shares of the five producers closely followed their allocated share.
[Zinc phosphate – EC, 72]
Specifically, the large customer Teknos, which regularly rotated
among the cartel members, was used as a form of compensation: “SNCZ
seemed to have undersold and was ‘allocated’ Teknos for 6 months.”
[Zinc phosphate – EC, 139]
3.2.2 Price wars and retaliation
Less explicit than the use of buy-backs, many cartels threatened a price
war if firms did not behave.
While a compensation scheme and retaliatory mechanism did not
exist, a competitor not following the agreed principles could face
aggressive market conduct by other tube producers. Whenever a
participant made an offer to the client allocated to another pro-
ducer and/or did not respect the agreed discount scheme, he was
immediately called and asked for justification. [Copper plumbing
tubes – EC, 224]
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In the carbonless paper cartel, cartel member AWA had a market
share in Europe of 30–35% and was the largest producer with capacity
exceeding twice that of any other firm. [Carbonless paper – EC, 105] It
used its dominant position in the market to threaten aggressive pric-
ing if firms did not comply with the collusive agreement. [Carbonless
paper – EC, 106]
Mougeot’s account of the meeting of 1 October 1993 indicates that
there were sanctions for failure to comply with the agreements: ‘[an
AWA employee] said quite expressly that he would not tolerate any
failure to follow this price increase and that he would “personally
look after” anyone who did not “play the game” ’. When asked to
describe the control mechanism and the reasons for the authority
of [this AWA employee] and AWA, Mougeot replied: ‘As far as we
know there were no contracts, documents or legal circumstances
which gave AWA any sort of authority. But they had a position of
moral and economic leadership on the market. To the old manufac-
turers [he] was the man who had successfully launched self-copying
papier in Europe for AWA, and then secured encouraging results in
the United States. AWA’s financial and industrial weight enabled
him to say that if any of these increases were not passed on AWA
would make it its business to push the market right down by apply-
ing a price policy that would leave most people high and dry. He
showed quite clearly what he was capable of by crushing Binda in
Italy’. [Carbonless paper – EC, 104]
In some cases, it was quite explicit that there would be targeted
retaliation against apparent deviators rather than a market-wide price
war. In the industrial and medical gases market, firms would keep track
of where customers were going and this information could be used to
retaliate for non-compliance.
The larger suppliers of industrial gases certainly maintain lists for
each competitor detailing customers they have lost and won. These
lists also indicate price concessions they had to accept because of
competitive offers made by that particular competitor. This knowl-
edge, together with lists of that competitor’s potentially interesting
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clients, allows the supplier in question to set up ‘hit lists’ for a
retaliation campaign. In AGA documents this retaliation policy is
referred to as the ‘balance of terror’. Retaliation campaigns need
not be restricted to the same geographic market. Several docu-
ments in the Commission’s file refer to cross-border retaliation,
notably in order to hit an aggressive competitor on its home mar-
ket, where suitable targets may be easier to find. [Industrial and
medical gases, EC1, 83]
In the lysine cartel, the Korean firm Sewon was demanding an
increase in its allocation from 37,000 tons to 50,000 tons. If Sewon actu-
ally supplied this larger amount, ADM threatened not only to lower the
price in the U.S. but also to increase its sales in Sewon’s home market
of Korea:
Sewon announced it had a target price of $2.20/kg in the US.
ADM said that if Sewon persisted with its 50,000 target that ADM
would push the US price down to 1.30/kg and that it would raise
its supply in Korea from 1,000 to 5,000. Sewon proposed to con-
tinue with price negotiations only. The other participants rejected
this on grounds that price negotiations were meaningless without
having a quantity agreement first. [Lysine – EC, 148]
Ajinomoto supported ADM’s threat and, through its subsidiary
Eurolysine, threatened Sewon with an anti-dumping complaint in
Europe if they did not limit their sales to 6,000 tons and maintain a
price of 4.25DM. In response to that threat, Sewon complied. [Lysine –
EC, 88]
3.3 Disruptions
3.3.1 Non-cartel suppliers
Another significant source of cartel instability came from sources of
supply that were not fully controlled by the cartel. One source was firms
who purchased the product from cartel members and either directly
resold it or added value to it and then resold it. In principle, the cartel
could control these suppliers by controlling the inputs they sold to
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them and/or having them join the cartel. Of course, excessive supply
by such resellers or value-added sellers could well be due to some cartel
members cheating by selling too much input to those firms. Where such
alternative suppliers were present, the cartel was aware that they could
be a serious disruption if the cartel failed to control their input supply.
In the choline chloride cartel, the resellers were either distributors or
what was known as “convertors” who purchased liquid choline chloride
and converted it into an alternative form for final use.
To ensure the effectiveness of the agreements regarding market
shares, customer allocations and prices, it was important for the
producers to control the behaviour of distributors and converters
of choline chloride in the market. The control over distributors was
pursued by agreeing not to sell at preferential prices to distributors,
while the control over converters was pursued either by ensuring
that they purchased their raw materials from the cartel members,
under the right conditions, or by informing them of the price levels
agreed among the three producers, in the hope that they would
follow these price levels, or, if necessary, by establishing exclusive
corporate ties over them. [Choline chloride – EC, 99]
A similar matter arose in the electrical and mechanical carbon and
graphite products cartel. Firms known as “cutters” would purchase
carbon blocks from the cartel members and then produce final products
that would compete with the cartel’s supply. Though this alternative
supply could be controlled by properly pricing carbon blocks, it proved
difficult to implement.
A European Scheme of September 1990 stipulated that within the
EEA, carbon blocks should be sold using the same price calcu-
lation as for carbon brushes. This meant that the price for the
semi-manufactured product had to be as high as the price of fin-
ished products like brushes. If this rule had been implemented by
all members, this would effectively have made competition from
cutters within the EEA impossible, at least to the extent that cut-
ters were supplied by members of the cartel. Apparently, however,
some of the cartel’s members did not want to give up the European
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cutters’ business altogether and continued to supply them at prices
below those of brushes. [EMCG – EC, 156]
One cutter in particular was aggressively supplying the German
market to the point that the cartel discussed a coordinated response.
A local meeting in Germany on 7 May 1992 records a discussion
among cartel members on how best to act against EKL, a com-
petitive East-German cutter that had entered aggressively into
the West-German market after unification. Two strategies were
agreed: First, none of the members of the cartel would supply
any graphite to EKL. Secondly, EKL would be denied any market
share by systematically undercutting it with all customers, so that
it would not be able to sell anywhere. EKL was taken over by SGL
in 1997. [EMCG – EC, 157]
The other source of alternative supply, which was more common
across cartels, was from firms not belonging to the cartel who possessed
production capacity. This might be due to the cartel not being all-
inclusive or because of later entry (possibly induced by the high prices
created by the cartel). One response to increased non-cartel supply was
to have the cartel members purchase the supply. This was used in the
vitamin B2 market.
In 1993, the parties realised that a US producer, Coors, had a
larger production capacity for vitamin B2 than they had estimated
in 1991. In order to prevent Coors from disrupting their arrange-
ments by the export of its production surplus, Roche and BASF
agreed that the former would contract to purchase 115 tonnes of
vitamin B2 (representing half of Coors’s capacity) in 1993. BASF
in turn would purchase 43 tonnes from Roche; the burden was
thus to be shared in the same 62:38 proportion as their quotas.
[Vitamins – EC, 287]
Or the cartel might take more drastic actions such as disciplining the
maverick firm or even trying to drive it out of the market. In the district
heating pipes cartel, the Swedish firm Powerpipe chose not to join the
cartel and later filed a complaint with the European Commission on the
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grounds that the colluding firms had acted anti-competitively against
it. The decision of the Court of First Instance stated:6
As a characteristic feature of the cartel, the decision refers in par-
ticular to the adoption and implementation of concerted measures
to eliminate Powerpipe, the only major undertaking which was
not a member. The Commission states that certain members of
the cartel recruited key employees of Powerpipe and gave Pow-
erpipe to understand that it should withdraw from the German
market. Following the award to Powerpipe of an important Ger-
man project, a meeting is said to have taken place in Düsseldorf
in March 1995 which was attended by the six major producers
and Brugg. According to the Commission, it was decided at that
meeting to organise a collective boycott of Powerpipe’s customers
and suppliers. The boycott was subsequently implemented.
There were other episodes of focused retaliation. Increased supply
by Chinese producers proved to be a problem for several cartels. In
vitamin B1, expansion in Chinese supply led cartel members to price
aggressively in a selective manner to reclaim lost customers. The price
cuts were enacted so that prices would “align on the Chinese prices
for feed grade to important customers but . . . higher pricing should
continue for food and pharmaceutical grades.” [Vitamins – EC, 258]
This was also done in the citric acid cartel though it proved unsuccessful
in stabilizing the cartel.
Due to the Chinese, the cartel’s share of global output fell from
70% to 52% over 1992–94 and this led to increased tension among
cartel members. Cartel members agreed a price war against Chi-
nese suppliers was necessary and customers for regaining were allo-
cated among the members; it became known as the Serbia list.
[Citric acid – EC, 188–9]
During the second period, from mid-1993 until the ending of the
cartel in May 1995, it became increasingly difficult for the partic-
ipating companies to sustain the price levels, in no small measure
6 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 20 March 2002. – ABB
Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission of the European Communities,13.
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due to a dramatic increase of citric acid imports from China, par-
ticularly into the European market. Accusations of cheating on
the agreement, especially against Jungbunzlauer, became rife and
the level of trust between the cartel members deteriorated. [Citric
acid – EC, 91]
A similarly difficult period was faced by the methionine cartel when
cartel member Sumitomo discontinued participation and Monsanto
entered the market with a liquid version of methionine.
Following these events, prices started to fall dramatically (Rhône-
Poulenc . . . even speaks of 30% by the summer and autumn of
1989). It appears that at first the remaining participants (Degussa,
Rhône-Poulenc and Nippon Soda) were in doubt about the best
way to react to the new situation: would they need to focus on
regaining market share or would it be more effective to focus on
prices? It is apparent from the evidence in the Commission’s file
that after having held various meetings in 1989 and 1990, the cartel
members agreed unanimously (at least by November 1990) to focus
their efforts on increasing prices. [Methionine – EC, 80]
Initially, however, the cartel members disagreed as to how to
respond as “Degussa wanted to win back market share by dropping
price for lost customers and, having done that, trying to raise price.
Rhône-Poulenc was more interested in just maintaining price and avoid-
ing a further price decline.” [Methionine – EC, 101–4]
Entry and capacity expansion was a serious problem in the mar-
ket for vitamin C and most likely caused the collapse of the cartel.
By early 1993, cartel members began to discuss how to respond to the
growing supply and low prices of the Chinese producers.7 There was
disagreement as Roche was in favor of reducing supply so as to maintain
and even raise the price, while Takeda was hesitant to reduce supply.
Takeda instead proposed to purchase Chinese supply; a proposal that
was rejected by the others. The cartel members eventually came to
an agreement whereby the sales quotas of the European producers –
7 The ensuing discussion is based on [Vitamins – EC, 431–57].
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Roche, BASF, and Merck – were reduced by 2.5% and Takeda’s by
2.2%. But Takeda did not follow through and only after the three other
firms threatened to discontinue the collusive arrangement did Takeda
comply. Nevertheless, Chinese supply continued to expand so that the
price had fallen by around one-third by 1995. As early as mid-1995
(as claimed by Roche) or at least by 1996, the vitamin C cartel had
collapsed amidst the aggressive pricing and expansion of Chinese pro-
ducers which was itself likely a response to the higher price resulting
from collusion.
A final tactic to forestall entry and growth in non-cartel supply
is for the cartel members to coordinate in not sharing the technology
required for producing the product. This was apparently done in the
graphite electrodes8 and sorbates cartels.
During the joint meetings, there was considerable discussion about
new market entrants, particularly the Chinese and the Russians.
In the late 1980’s and during the 1990’s several potential com-
petitors from China requested sorbates technology from the exist-
ing producers, but Hoechst and the Japanese producers decided
that no technology would be provided to other sorbates producers.
[Sorbates – EC2, 117]
3.3.2 Over-zealous sales representatives
A rather different source of disruption arises from employees of the col-
luding firms who are not themselves aware of the collusive arrangement.
This was well-recognized in the fine arts auction house cartel. The non-
negotiability of the commission schedule was considered critical and its
implementation relied on lower-level employees not deviating from it,
nor finding ways around it by offering equivalent benefits to clients
(while, all the time, being unaware of the collusive arrangement). But
it was soon made clear to the colluding CEOs that employees were wary
of the non-negotiable schedule and may look for ways to circumvent it.
8 United States. Dept. of Justice. “Japanese Subsidiary Charged with International Con-
spiracy to Fix Prices for Graphite Electrodes in U.S.” Press Release. February 23, 1998.
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The non-negotiability of the new commission structure was strictly
implemented. Staff at Sotheby’s would sometimes complain about
the rigidity of the non-negotiable vendor’s commission structure.
In Amsterdam, the Sotheby’s people feared they would (together
with Christie’s) lose business to other auction houses. There were
also fears that Christie’s would not adhere to “the agreed commis-
sion structure”. A proposal to adapt the commissions was firmly
rejected by headquarters, despite the alarming messages from the
Amsterdam office. Instead, they received instructions to clearly
follow the instruction set out by [officer of Sotheby’s] on the new
vendor’s commission. [Fine arts auction houses – EC, 113]
One response by the senior management (engaged in collusion) was
to centralize authority.
[An officer of Christie’s] identified an unintended risk that could
arise if the two auction houses adhered rigidly as agreed to the
commission sales with no chance to undercut on price; their depart-
ment chiefs would vie with each other to get quality business by
making excessive estimates of what items would fetch: “If no price
competition, pressure to get best stuff will result in overestimat-
ing”. (If the estimates were excessive, it would increase the risks
attached to guarantees and loans). To avoid this problem, [offi-
cer of Christie’s] suggested a formal procedure for estimates with
three signatures required over a certain amount. [Fine arts auction
houses – EC, 120–1]
The problem of aggressive sales people was noted as a possible
source of non-compliance in the industrial and medical gases cartel
as well.
There are a number of instances in which a firm had offered gases
at prices and other trading conditions below what had been agreed.
Some of these instances may have been acts of retaliation, others
may have been carried out by over-zealous salesmen. [Industrial
and medical gases – EC1, 345]
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This was particularly a concern during the several month period
in which firms were, in a staggered manner, implementing new price
increases. To deal with this problem, a moratorium was put in place
whereby each company’s customers were not to be approached; this
was expressly conveyed to their sales people.
That [cartel member] AGA put the moratorium into effect is shown
by the internal instructions it issued on 28 November 1989 . . . to
focus on implementing the 5% price increase with existing cus-
tomers and explaining that competitors could be expected to do
the same. [Industrial and medical gases – EC1, 161]
The issue of controlling the sales force was probably most prominent
in the lysine cartel. Senior management at ADM saw the sales people
as potentially in collusion with buyers and that they were not to be
trusted.
[ADM executives] Wilson and Whitacre emphasized it was key
that each company controlled its sales force. The sales reps had a
tendency to become buyer advocates and to cut price. They told
the cartel that, in the previous week, ADM’s best salesman had
given a customer a price of only $1.13. The salesman was fired.
[Lieber (2000, p. 151)]
The ADM sales force was kept out of the loop. [ADM executive
Michael Andreas said:] “The salesman could go off to another com-
pany and turn in the top people at ADM and report that there’s
price-fixing. So, the salesmen couldn’t be trusted.” [Lieber (2000,
p. 251)]
ADM responded to this problem by having pricing centralized “at
the highest level” and encouraged the other cartel members to do the
same. [Lieber (2000, p. 170)]
In the isostatic graphite cartel, the risk of sales people deviating
from the collusive prices was considered serious enough that senior
management decided to bring them in on the scheme, in spite of the
added risks of collusion being discovered by the antitrust authorities.
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UCAR further points out that the participants also stated the
prices of isostatic products that they had been quoting to each
customer and that there were often disputes over the lowering of
prices. At a certain moment, again according to UCAR, the partic-
ipants agreed to enlarge the meetings to include the salesmen, in
an attempt to impress on the sales force the importance of follow-
ing the pricing directives that they received from their supervisors.
[Isostatic graphite – EC, 245]
4
What is the Structure and Organization of
Meetings?
Thus far we have discussed the collusive outcome – in terms of price
and the allocation of supply – and the manner in which it was enforced.
Enforcement deals with monitoring the agreement, punishing for vio-
lations, and responding to external sources of disruptions. All of these
decisions are handled within the context of communication between the
members of the cartel. A potentially important determinant of cartel
behavior is then the frequency with which firms communicate. This
can determine the frequency and periodicity of observed changes in
firm behavior (in particular, price) but can also influence the stability
of the cartel.
Though we’ve spoken of a cartel member as some monolithic entity,
in fact it is represented by a firm’s employees who are engaged in col-
lusion. This raises the question of how duties in running the cartel are
allocated across employees. Who decides on price and the allocation?
Who implements the allocation (for example, by allocating customers
and projects)? Who monitors the agreement? All of these questions
pertain to the organizational structure of the cartel. While it is not
clear what are the implication of organizational form for firm behavior,
it does seem relevant and so we report the information here though
without an associated analysis.
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4.1 Frequency of cartel meetings
A potentially important distinction between a collusive and competitive
industry is the frequency with which firms act. In that collusion requires
firms first to communicate and coordinate before, say, changing price,
it is not difficult to imagine that price changes are less frequent for a
cartel and, furthermore, there may be a periodicity to price changes due
to the periodicity of meetings. Of course, firms could meet with some
regularity, yet agree to future price changes which need not follow the
same timing. Nevertheless, there is a cost to agreeing to a price change
that is to commence in, say, two months; if cost and demand conditions
have changed in two months then this reduces the appropriateness of
that price change. For this reason, the timing of meetings is apt to
influence when changes in cartel behavior are enacted and, in partic-
ular, periodicity of meetings might result in periodicity of changes in
market behavior.
In discussing the timing and frequency with which a cartel acts,
there are two issues that I’ll address. First, the frequency with which
firms decide on the allocation, specifically, price and quantity (includ-
ing sales quotas and allocating customers or projects). Second, the
frequency with which firms monitor the agreement by exchanging infor-
mation and comparing the realized outcome with the agreed-upon
outcome.
Table 4.1 reports the frequency of meetings for those cartels for
which sufficient information was available. “Type” refers to the allo-
cation scheme: sales quota (SQ), exclusive territories (ET), and cus-
tomer allocation (CA). “Allocation” refers to the frequency with which
an allocation was selected; “Monitoring” refers to the frequency with
which monitoring took place.
Generally, meetings to decide on an allocation took place either
quarterly or semi-annually. However, the time between meetings could
be much shorter when firms were allocating customers. In the case of
the district heating pipes cartel, the cartel met every two to three weeks
to allocate projects. Here, it is important to distinguish between the
meeting to settle upon an allocation of sales quotas – which is typically
only twice a year – with meetings to implement that allocation through
4.1. Frequency of cartel meetings 75
Table 4.1 Frequency of Meetings
Market Type Allocation Monitoring
Choline chloride SQ, ET, CA 2/year every 2–3 weeks
Citric acid SQ 2/year monthly*
Copper plumbing tubes SQ annual every 1–2 months
District heating pipes SQ, CA every 2–3 weeks ?
Elec. mech. carb. graphite SQ, CA 2/year weekly/monthly
Graphite electrodes SQ 1–2/year 2-3/year
Isostatic graphite ET? 2–3/year 2/year
Lysine SQ quarterly monthly*
Methionine SQ? 2–4/year n/a
Nucleotides CA, ET 2/year ?
Organic peroxides SQ, CA 2–4/year quarterly*
Plasterboard SQ ? quarterly
Sorbates SQ 2/year 2/year
Vitamins (A, E) SQ 2–3/year weekly/quarterly
Zinc phosphate SQ quarterly monthly
* Buy-backs occurred annually.
Source: Various European Commission Decisions
a divvying up of customers and projects – which has a frequency dic-
tated by the flow of new projects and customers. My reading of the
cases leads to me to the tentative claim that the frequency of meetings
is highest for a customer allocation scheme and lowest for exclusive
territories, with a pure sales quota scheme between those two.
Firms met noticeably more frequently to monitor an allocation as
opposed to deciding on an allocation. Most cartels exchanged infor-
mation – generally regarding sales – on a monthly or quarterly basis
with some doing it as often as weekly through phone or fax rather than
face-to-face meetings. Among the cartels that used buy-backs and their
frequency was reported, buy-backs occurred annually. As mentioned
earlier, that monitoring occurred on a higher frequency than buy-backs
gave cartel members the opportunity to adjust their sales and avoid the
need to make compensation at the year’s end.
Many cartels chose to time their meetings – typically, allocation
meetings – so that it would coincide with a meeting of a trade
association. In the carbonless paper cartel, general planning meet-
ings were conducted under the cover of the meetings of the Asso-
ciation of European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper. [Carbonless
paper – EC, 83] With choline chloride, meetings were generally (though
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not exclusively) scheduled either before or after the meetings of the
European Chemical Industry Council. [Choline chloride – EC, 98] The
general meetings of the citric acid cartel were scheduled to coincide
with those of the general assembly of the European Citric Acid Man-
ufacturers Association (ECAMA); meetings typically took place the
evening prior to the official ECAMA meeting. [Citric acid – EC, 87]
Coordination with trade association meetings also took place with car-
tels in copper plumbing tubes [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 112],
industrial and medical gases [Industrial and medical gases – EC, 105],
and industrial tubes [Industrial tubes – EC, 10].
Scheduling to convene the cartel at a trade association meeting is
obviously convenient – as many of the executives are to be there any-
way – but it also serves the purposes of avoiding detection of the cartel.
The trade association meeting provides a cover for why executives of
competing firms are all at the same venue. For this reason, ADM pushed
early on for the formation of a lysine producers’ association in order to
provide a regular venue to hide their illicit meetings.
From the first contacts made in April 1992 with his Asian rivals,
ADM’s Terrance Wilson pushed for the formation of a formal
lysine association to facilitate the conspiracy. Wilson had in mind
two models, the European Citric Acid Manufacturers Association
(ECAMA) and the Corn Refiners Association (CRA) in the United
States. Both of these organizations held regular meetings to dis-
cuss perfectly legal matters of common interest, and both collected
members’ sales data. ECAMA collected citric acid sales volumes
monthly and shared all that information with each of its mem-
bers . . . The biennial meetings of ECAMA were pretexts for holding
secret parallel price-fixing sessions for citric acid. [Connor (2001,
p. 220)]
The attractiveness of meeting under cover was clearly apparent in
an episode with the lysine cartel. Generally, the Japanese producers
preferred not to meet in the U.S. because of its stringent antitrust
laws. However, later in the cartel’s life when concerns about discovery
had heightened, the cartel members chose to meet in Atlanta because
they could meet under the cover of a poultry conference (as lysine is
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used to build muscle in chickens). Apparently, the cover that it provided
compensated for having to meet in the U.S. as opposed to Europe or
Asia. Still, the cartel members recognized that they had to be careful.
After meeting in a hotel room at the poultry conference, the cartel
members left the room separately because they didn’t want customers
seeing a group of competitors leaving together. [Lieber (2000, p. 234)]
One final anecdote speaks to the determinants of the frequency of
meetings. It was reported that the frequency of meetings of the cop-
per plumbing tubes cartel appeared to negatively correlate with the
growth rate of demand. The European Commission found that from
late 1994 onwards, probably due to the increased demand coming from
the German construction boom, there were fewer contacts between car-
tel members and apparently the cartel did not meet at all in 1995.
With the weakening of the German economy in 1996, meetings were
re-established. [Copper plumbing tubes – EC, 215]
4.2 Organizational structure of the cartel
One of the more striking features of several cartels is the sophistica-
tion of their organizational structure. Some cartels – like the lysine
cartel – operated with a single level so that the same set of employ-
ees performed all functions. Other cartels organized themselves into
both a general group – comprised of all cartel members – and regional
sub-groups. The choline chloride cartel had all cartel members meet to
coordinate with respect to the global market and, in addition, European
suppliers would meet to coordinate with respect to the European mar-
ket. [Choline chloride – EC, 64] In fact, the global cartel collapsed in
mid-1994, while the European cartel persisted until late 1998. In the
case of the sorbates cartel, the Japanese producers met as a group prior
to and after the general cartel meeting which also included European
producer Hoechst. [Sorbates – EC, 83]
Our primary interest here, however, is with describing a hierar-
chical structure for allocating duties across employees of the cartel
participants. Table 4.2 includes those cartels which used a multi-level
structure in performing the tasks of choosing, implementing, monitor-
ing, and enforcing a collusive outcome. The column for “Price” denotes
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the level(s) at which price was determined; the column for “Quantity”
denotes the level(s) at which the market allocation was determined; the
column for “Monitoring” denotes the level(s) at which monitoring was
performed; and the column for “Implementation” denotes the level(s)
at which price and/or the allocation was implemented. The column for
“Employees” lists the positions of the employees engaged at that level
where “Senior management” refers to CEO, president, director, chair-
man, and/or general manager. An important area for future research
is to understand how the design of the cartel’s organization affects
observable behavior in terms of frequency of price changes, the allo-
cation mechanism, time series on market shares, cartel stability, and
other relevant variables.
5
Concluding Remarks
At the same time that one has disdain for these firms that engaged
in price-fixing, one cannot help be impressed with the sophistication
of their behavior. Firms were often meticulous in designing an agree-
ment to minimize opportunities for cheating and in structuring both
monitoring and punishment schemes to weaken the incentives to cheat.
To implement such a complex arrangement, some cartels created an
impressive organizational structure that entailed frequent communica-
tion and face-to-face meetings. In spite of all their efforts, collusion was
far from perfect. There are episodes of noncompliance by cartel mem-
bers, deceptive practices when it comes to monitoring, over-zealous
sales representatives ignorant of collusion disrupting the agreement,
and increased supply from non-cartel firms in response to the high
prices of cartel members. Nevertheless, many of these cartels were
apparently operating effectively until discovered and prosecuted.
The information provided in this study should be useful for both
policy and research purposes. From a research perspective, a better
understanding of the institutional structure of cartels ought to help in
developing better theoretical and empirical models. Of particular inter-
est is contributing to the development of models of hard-core cartels
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by encompassing those features that distinguish this brand of collu-
sion from the tacit variety. From a policy perspective, better knowledge
about collusive practices should assist in improving methods for detect-
ing cartels and for constructing evidence to support a case that firms
have violated Article 81 of the Treaty of the European Communities
in the European Union or Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United
States.
Appendix A
Industries
This study is based on case material – almost entirely from European
Commission decisions – for the following industries: carbonless paper,
choline chloride, citric acid, commercial explosives, copper plumbing
tubes, district heating pipes, electrical and mechanical carbon and
graphite products, fine arts auction houses, graphite electrodes, indus-
trial and medical gases, industrial tubes, isostatic graphite, lysine,
methionine, nucleotides, organic peroxides, plasterboard, seamless steel
tubes, soda ash, sodium gluconate, sorbates, vitamins, and zinc phos-
phate. For these markets, brief descriptions are provided of the product,
geographic markets affected by collusion, companies that participated
in the cartel, and the duration of the cartel. Duration typically refers to
“official duration” and there may be evidence consistent with a longer
duration (typically with collusion starting earlier than the official start
date). In some cases, I also provide some other relevant facts. Most
of these descriptions are taken verbatim from the relevant European
Commission decision (which is cited in Appendix B).
A.1 Carbonless paper
Product description: Carbonless paper, also known as self-copying
paper, is used for the multiple duplication of documents and is made
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from a paper base to which layers of chemical products are applied.
The principal clients in the self-copying paper sector are printers who
convert carbonless paper to business forms and rolls.
Geographic markets: In the European Economic Area (EEA) the
production of carbonless paper is concentrated and mills are located
in five Community Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. Generally speaking, however, producers sell
throughout the EEA, and transport costs do not seem to hinder trade
inside this area.
Companies: Arjo Wiggins Appleton, Binda, Carrs, Copigraph,
Divipa, Koehler, Mougeot Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel, Zanders,
Zicuñaga.
Duration: January 1992 to September 1995.
Table A.1 Price Increases for Carbonless Paper (“Reels”)
Date of Meeting Date of Price Change Price Increase
October 1, 1993 December 1, 1993 10%
January 20, 1994 April 1, 1994 6%
May 31, 1994 July 1, 1994 6%
July 1994 (?) October 1, 1994 10%
Source: Carbonless paper – EC, 142
“As the price increases were cumulative, the total increase was to
be 36% whereas Mougeot increased its prices for reels by a total of only
29%.” [Carbonless paper – EC, 143]
A.2 Choline chloride
Product description: Choline chloride is a member of the B-complex
group of water-soluble vitamins (vitamin B4). It is mainly used in the
animal feed industry (especially for poultry and swine) as a traditional
feed additive to increase growth, reduce mortality rates, increase feed
efficiency, increase egg production, and improve meat quality.
Geographic markets: At the start of the period of investigation,
choline chloride was produced mainly in Europe and North America
(United States and Canada), although there was also production capac-
ity in China, India, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The North American
producers were exporting to Central and South America, Europe, the
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Far East, and the South East. The European producers were starting
to export to Central and South America, Africa, the South East, and
the Far East. European and North American producers also had pro-
duction facilities in different areas of the world and were expanding
local production in order to cut transportation and storage costs and
better penetrate local markets.
Companies: Akzo Nobel, BASF, Bioproducts, Chinook, DuCoa,
UCB.
Duration: Global, November 1992 to April 1994; European, March
1994 to October 1998.
A.3 Citric acid
Product description: Citric acid is widely distributed throughout
nature, occurring in both plants and animals. It is used primarily in
the food and beverage industry, where its high solubility, tart flavor,
acidity and buffering capabilities make it the most widely adopted acid-
ulent/preservative worldwide. Citric acid is also utilized in household
detergents and cleansers, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, and indus-
trial uses.
Geographic markets: While sales and production tend to be com-
partmentalized in three major geographical areas – North America,
Europe and Asia – significant amounts of product are traded between
these zones. In the case of the European Community, imports from
China alone account for almost 20% of total consumption, although
those imports are made by dozens of small companies. Cartel members
made up 60% of global production and 67% of E.U. production.
Companies: Archer Daniels Midland Company, Cerestar Bioprod-
ucts, Haarmann & Reimer Corporation, F. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Jungbunzlauer.
Duration: March 1991 (first multilateral meeting) to May 1995.
A.4 Commercial explosives
Product description: Commercial explosives, which include dynamite
and ANFO (ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil), are primarily used
in the mining, construction, and oil and gas industries.
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Duration: Depending on the particular geographic market, the ear-
liest cartel started in Fall 1988 and the last cartel ended in early 1996.
Most of the cartels lasted about four years.
A.5 Copper plumbing tubes
Product description: Copper plumbing tubes (also called sanitary
tubes, water tubes, and installation tubes) are used for water, oil, gas,
and heating installations in the construction industry. The main cus-
tomers are distributors, wholesalers, and retailers that sell the plumbing
tubes to installers and other end consumers.
Geographic markets: The scope of business of the copper plumbing
tube suppliers is essentially Europe, including the Community/EEA.
There are limited exports outside Europe. Transportation costs are esti-
mated to be generally below 5% within Europe, and most European
suppliers are in a position to supply the entire European market regard-
less of factory location.
Companies: Boliden, Austria Buntmetall and Buntmetall
Amstetten, Halcor, HME Nederland, IMI plc, IMI Kynoch and
Yorkshire Copper Tube, KME-group, Mueller Industries, WTC
Holding Company, Mueller Europe, DENO Holding Company and
DENO Acquisition EURL, Outokumpu Oyj and Outokumpu Copper
Products Oy, Wieland Werke.
Duration: June 1988/Sept 1989 to Sept 1999/March 2001. First
informal competitor contacts, mostly on a bilateral basis, started as
early as 1987.
A.6 District heating pipes
Product description: In district heating systems, water heated in a cen-
tral site is taken by underground pipes to the premises to be heated.
Since the temperature of the water or steam carried in the pipes is
very high, the pipes must be insulated in order to ensure an economic,
risk-free distribution. The pipes used are pre-insulated and, for that
purpose, generally consist of a steel tube surrounded by a plastic tube
with a layer of insulating foam between them.
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Geographic markets: There is a substantial trade in district heating
pipes between Member States. The largest national markets in the E.U.
are Germany, with 40% of Community consumption, and Denmark,
with 20%. Denmark has 50% of the manufacturing capacity in the E.U.
and is the main production center in the Union, supplying all Member
States in which district heating is used.
Companies: ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Brugg Rohrsysteme, Dansk
Rørindustri, Henss/Isoplus Group, Ke Kelit Kunststoffwerk, Oy KWH
Tech, Løgstør Rør; Pan-Isovit, Sigma Tecnologie Di Rivestimento,
Tarco Energie.
Duration: Denmark, November/December 1990 to March/April
1996; other European countries, late 1994 to March/April 1996.
A.7 Electrical and mechanical carbon graphite products
Product description: These products are produced from carbon and
graphite for ultimate applications in either the electrical or mechani-
cal field. There are thousands of varieties of electrical and mechanical
carbon and graphite products. Most often they are customer-designed,
and certification of the product’s conformity to product requirements
is usually necessary before the product can be used.
Geographic markets: The geographic focus of this market is within
the EEA. Because products are developed in close cooperation between
producers and customers, production takes place as close as possible to
customers. As a consequence, a large percentage of products sold were
produced in the country in which they were sold.
Companies: C. Conradty Nürnberg, Hoffmann & Co. Elektrokohle,
Le Carbone Lorraine, Morgan Crucible Company, Schunk GmbH and
Schunk Kohlenstofftechnik, SGL Carbon.
Duration: October 1988 to December 1999. The first evidence of
a European-wide cartel among suppliers of electrical and mechanical
carbon and graphite products dates back to April 5, 1937. Some time
after World War II, the cartel was re-constructed. According to SGL,
the cartel was in operation at least as early as the end of the 1970’s,
but probably before as well.
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A.8 Fine arts auction houses
Product description: Auction houses sell fine art objects, antiques, fur-
niture, collectibles and memorabilia as the agent of the consignor,
billing the buyer for the goods purchased and remitting to the con-
signor the monies received after deduction of commission, expenses,
and taxes.
Geographic markets: Christie’s and Sotheby’s are both present in
nearly all EEA countries for buying (consigning) property; selling
(auctioning) takes place in only few countries within the EEA. Further-
more, buyers at auction in London or other EEA salerooms often are
non-EEA residents, while a significant part of items sold originate from
non-EEA located sellers. The same applies for auction in New York,
Geneva, and other auction locations.
Companies: Christie’s, Sotheby’s.
Duration: April 1993 to February 2000.
The commission rate is the percentage of the final bid price.
Table A.2 Commission Charges for Sellers (Christie’s) Press Release: March 1995, Effective:
September 1, 1995
Annual Sales Commission
Up to $99,999 As now*
$100,000–$249,999 9%
$250,000–$499,999 8%
$500,000–$999,999 6%
$1,000,000–$2,499,999 5%
$2,500,000–$4,999,999 4%
$5,000,000 and above 2%
* 10% for most consignments but higher
rates for lots selling less than $75,000.
Source: Mason (2004)
A.9 Graphite electrodes
Product description: Graphite electrodes are ceramic-molded columns
of graphite used primarily in the production of steel in electric arc fur-
naces, also referred to as ‘mini-mills’. Electric arc furnace steelmaking
is essentially a recycling process whereby scrap steel is converted into
new steel.
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Table A.3 Commission Charges for Sellers (Sotheby’s) Press Release: April 13, 1995, Effec-
tive: September 5, 1995
Annual Sales Private Dealer Museum
0–$99,999 CCR* CCR CCR
$100,000–$249,999 9% 6% 5%
$250,000–$499,999 8% 6% 5%
$500,000–$999,999 6% 6% 5%
$1,000,000–$2,499,999 5% 5% 3%
$2,500,000–$4,999,999 4% 4% 2%
$5,000,000–$9,999,999 2% 2% 2%
$10,000,000–$24,999,999 ** ** **
$25,000,000+ *** *** ***
Source: Mason (2004)
* Current commission rates.
** Lower of 2% or 50% of expenses
*** Lower of 2% up to $25,000,000. and 1% on any
amount over $25,000,000. or 50% of expenses.
Geographic markets: All the Member States of the EEA are pro-
ducers of electric steel and consumers of graphite electrodes. The two
main producers of electrodes have facilities in several Member States –
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Austria and Belgium. The two others
both produce in Germany only.
Companies: SGL Carbon, UCAR International, VAW Aluminium,
Showa Denko K.K., Tokai Carbon Co., Nippon Carbon Co.
Duration: May 1992 to February/March 1998.
“Ibiden and Tokai recall that during the meeting Mr. [SGL
employee] indicated that thanks to the collaboration achieved in the
market of graphite electrodes the parties had succeeded in increasing
prices by 50 percent.” [Isostatic graphite – EC, 129]
“The cartel agreements were implemented by a series of step
increases between 1992 and 1996. During this period prices nearly dou-
bled.” [Graphite electrodes – EC, 137]
A.10 Industrial and medical gases
Product description: Industrial gases are either derived from air, in air
separation tonnage plants (for example, oxygen, nitrogen, argon), or are
produced in tonnage plants through a chemical process (for example,
carbon dioxide, hydrogen, acetylene), often as a by-product. Industrial
gases are used in most industries and manufacturing processes. Medical
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gases are used in hospitals, clinics, and in home treatment. The largest
volumes of industrial and medical gases are used for producing, cutting,
and welding metals and in the chemical industry.
Geographic markets: The geographic market for supplying indus-
trial gases is limited by the costly means of transport and can therefore
be defined as local or regional in scope. Production and supply of indus-
trial gases in the European Community is dominated by a few large,
multinational groups, which have national subsidiaries in most Mem-
ber States. These subsidiaries supply bulk gases to local depot holders
and to end-customers and cylinder gases to end-customers within that
particular Member State only. These subsidiaries also set prices and
other commercial conditions for supplies within that Member State.
Companies: AGA, Air Liquide, Air Products Nederland, BOC
Group, Messer Nederland, NV Hoek Loos, Westfalen Gassen
Nederland.
Duration: September 1993 to December 1997.
A.11 Industrial tubes
Product description: Copper tubes are generally divided into two prod-
uct groups: plumbing tubes used for water, oil, gas and heating instal-
lations, and industrial tubes which are divided into sub-groups based
on the end use. The most important of the latter in terms of volume is
air-conditioning and refrigeration (ACR) industry, the other industrial
applications being mainly fittings, refrigeration, gas heater, filter dryer
and telecommunication tubes. Industrial tubes, ACR-tubes in partic-
ular, are typically supplied in annealed level wound coils (LWC) in
lengths ranging up to several kilometers. LWC’s, to which the Decision
is confined, were introduced in the 1980’s as a substitute for straight
length tubes and were specifically developed for automated manufac-
turing lines of air-conditioning producers. Industrial tubes are normally
used by and supplied directly to industrial customers, original equip-
ment manufacturers or part manufacturers.
Geographic markets: The major producers of LWC tubes in
Europe are currently KME, Outokumpu, and WielandWerke. These
undertakings together accounted for about 75–85% of the total EEA
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market. Other significant producers within the European market
include Feinrohren S.p.A of Italy and Halcor S.A. of Greece.
Companies: Wieland Werke, Outokumpu Copper Products OY,
Outokumpu Oyj, KM Europa Metal, Tréfimétaux, Europa Metalli.
Duration: May 1988 to March 2001.
A.12 Isostatic graphite
Product description: Specialty graphites is the general term widely used
in the industry to describe a group of graphite products for diverse
applications (other than steel making graphite electrodes, graphite
anodes for the chemical industries, and carbon electrodes for the
refining of ferrous alloys and cathodes for aluminum reduction cells).
Specialty graphite products are often categorized as either isostatic
graphite, extruded graphite, or molded graphite. The prices of each
graphite category differ according to their mechanical characteristics
and, from the production point of view, a partially different machinery
is necessary for each type of production process so there is no supply-
side substitutability among the three categories.
Geographic markets: The Commission considers that the market for
specialty graphite as a whole, and in particular the markets for isostatic
and extruded specialty, are world-wide markets. Transportation costs
and tariff barriers might well lead to somewhat higher costs, but they
do not prevent the producers from trading on a worldwide basis. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese producers, without having
any production sites outside Japan, were able to trade in Europe and
to obtain a market share of more than 20% in the market of isostatic
specialty graphite in blocks and cut blocks.
Companies: SGL Carbon, Le Carbone-Lorraine, Ibiden Co., Tokai
Carbon Co., Toyo Tanso Co., GrafTech International, NSCC Techno
Carbon Co., Nippon Steel Chemical Co., Intech EDM.
Duration: July 1993 to February 1998. There is evidence of meetings
going back to Fall 1988.
“The cumulative price increase applied by Tokai in the period
January 1994 to January 1997 amounts to 52.7%.” [Isostatic graphite –
EC, 285]
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A.13 Lysine
Product description: Lysine is an essential amino acid. Amino acids
are building blocks of protein, a major component of body tissues.
Animals synthesize body proteins from amino acids released during
digestion, but can only synthesize some of the 22 different amino acids
that account for all the proteins found in life. The others, designated
as essential, must be supplied by the diet, either bound naturally to
protein or in a chemically pure form. Feed-grade lysine has been pro-
duced commercially for some 30 years and the growth in the use of
this amino acid worldwide has been remarkable. Although this rise in
consumption is partially attributable to the increase in pig and poultry
production that has occurred worldwide, it also reflects an increasing
sophistication in the formulation of livestock diets.
Geographic markets: Eurolysine is the sole lysine producer in the
EEA. Before 1991, there were only three lysine producers: Ajinomoto/
Eurolysine, Kyowa, and Sewon. In 1991, ADM and Cheil entered the
lysine market. ADM’s plant essentially doubled the world’s lysine pro-
duction capacity.
Companies: Archer Daniels Midland Company, Ajinomoto
Co./Eurolysine, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co., Daesang Corporation, Cheil
Jedang Corporation, Fefana.
Duration: September 1990 to June 1995.
A.14 Methionine
Product description: Methionine is an amino acid that is added to com-
pound animal feeds and premixes for all animal species. The principal
application is in poultry feed, but methionine is also increasingly being
added to pig feed and specialty animal feeds.
Geographic markets: Methionine is produced in three Member
States (Germany, France, and Spain) and marketed throughout the
Community. All but one of the addressees of the Decision had produc-
tion facilities in the European Community (in certain cases through
subsidiaries). Additional sales of methionine in the Community come
from other countries such as Japan and the U.S.
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Companies: Aventis (formerly Rhône-Poulenc), Aventis Animal,
Nippon Soda Company, Degussa.
Duration: February 1986 to February 1999.
A.15 Nucleotides
Product description: Nucleic acid or nucleotide is made from glucose
through a process of fermentation, separation, crystallization, and fil-
tration. There are two nucleotides, which are used for food flavor
enhancement, namely disodium 5’-inosinate (IMP) and disodium 5’-
guanylate (GMP). Both are used by major food manufacturers to add
flavor to foods either on their own or, most often, in combination with
MSG. They are mainly used to replace beef extracts, to enhance sweet
and meaty flavors, to mask “off” flavors in various food formulations,
and to overcome bitterness.
Geographic markets: The nucleotides business is essentially a global
one. The major producers of nucleotides are large, multinational cor-
porations established in Japan and South Korea. Although produc-
tion is essentially based in Asia, sales are global with most occurring
in North America, Europe and Asia. All nucleotides sold in the EEA
are imported from outside the EEA, though there are important flows
between the Member States, through sales subsidiaries or distributors
established in the Community.
Companies: Ajinomoto Co., Takeda Chemical Industries, Daesang
Corporation, Cheil Jedang Corporation.
Duration: End of 1988 to June 1998.
A.16 Organic peroxides
Product description: An organic peroxide is any organic molecule con-
taining a “peroxy” or oxygen-oxygen bond. Organic peroxides serve a
critically important role in the plastics and rubber industries where
they have three main applications: (1) the polymerization of thermo-
plastic resins (so-called high polymer or “HP” applications); (2) the
curing of unsaturated polyester thermoset resins (so-called “UP” appli-
cations); and (3) cross-linking (so-called “XL” applications).
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Geographic markets: While transport and security costs as well as
national legislation served as certain obstacles to cross-border trade,
especially prior to the completion of the single market, the market for
organic peroxides can nevertheless be seen as at least EEA-wide.
Companies: Akzo Nobel Chemicals International, Akzo Nobel Poly-
mer Chemicals, Akzo Nobel, Atofina, Degussa UK Holdings Limited,
Peroxid Chemie GmbH & Co., Peroxidos Organicos, AC Treuhand.
Duration: January 1971 to December 1999. The Spanish market
(1975–1999), the French market (1971–1991), and the UK market
(1971–1991) were subject to specific meetings within the broader frame-
work of the European cartel.
A.17 Plasterboard
Product description: Plasterboard is a manufactured product used as a
prefabricated construction material and consisting of a sheet of gypsum
plaster sandwiched between two sheets of paper or some other material.
Plasterboard is typically used as an internal lining for walls, to form
internal partitions inside buildings, as a roof lining, and as a ceiling
material for residential, commercial, and administrative premises. The
properties which make plasterboard an attractive product for the build-
ing industry are its stability, durability, easy application, fire resistance,
and low cost.
Geographic markets: Since the late 1980s, the market has developed
from a collection of “national” markets, each dominated by the local
producer, into a more “European” market in the sense that the major
suppliers are now present in all the national markets. Nevertheless,
cross-border trade at wholesale or distributor level is limited, despite
the substantial price differences. Among the reasons cited by the pro-
ducers for the relatively low level of cross-border trade are differences
in standards, differences in standard board widths between countries,
the non-availability in destination countries of the required accessories,
and differences in technical language within the building trade.
Companies: BPB, Gebrüder Knauf Westdeutsche Gipswerke,
Société Lafarge, Gyproc Benelux.
Duration: Mid 1992 to late 1998.
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A.18 Seamless steel tubes
Product description: The steel pipe and tube sector comprises a great
variety of pipes and tubes, which are manufactured by different pro-
cesses for a whole series of uses. A distinction is drawn, according to the
manufacturing process, between seamless steel pipes and tubes, which
are made from pierced and hot reduced solid products without remov-
ing any metal, and welded steel pipes and tubes, which are made from
flat products and then shaped and welded. The products concerned
in this case are seamless, carbon-steel pipes and tubes, in particular
those used by the oil and gas industry, which account for 40–50% of
the consumption of seamless pipes and tubes.
Geographic markets: The European Community is the main produc-
tion area for seamless pipes and tubes in the world. It exports about
45% of its production and is thus the leading world exporter, closely
followed by Japan and Latin America. Within the European Commu-
nity, six countries produce seamless pipes and tubes; Germany, Italy,
and France together account for 85% of production.
Companies: Mannesmannröhren-Werke, Vallourec, British Steel
Limited, Dalmine, Sumitomo Metal Industries, Nippon Steel Corpo-
ration, Kawasaki Steel Corporation, NKK Corporation.
Duration: 1977 to 1995.
A.19 Soda ash
Product description: Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is an alkaline chem-
ical commodity which is mainly used as a raw material in the manufac-
ture of glass. Soda ash is also used in the chemical industry, for making
detergents, and in metallurgy.
Geographic markets: The west European market for soda ash in the
late 1980’s was characterized by separation along national lines. The
producers tended to concentrate their sales on those Member States
where they possessed production facilities, although from 1981 or 1982
onwards the smaller producers increased sales outside their home mar-
kets. In the Member States where Solvay was the sole locally established
producer (Italy, Portugal and Spain), it virtually had a monopoly.
Solvay’s market share was in excess of 80% in Belgium, 55% in France,
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and 52% in Germany. ICI had over 90% of the UK market, the only
alternative sources of supply being the U.S. and Poland.
Companies: Solvay, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Rhône-
Poulenc, Akzo, Matthes & Weber, Chemische Fabrik Kalk.
Duration: Sometime in 1987 to at least 1989.
A.20 Sodium gluconate
Product description: Sodium gluconate is an industrial metal and glass
cleaner used for bottle washing, food service and utensil cleaning, food
process equipment cleaning, and paint removal.
Companies: Akzo Nobel NV (and its subsidiary Akzo Nobel Chem-
icals BV), AVEBE BA (and its subsidiary Glucona BV), Roquette
Freres, Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Archer Daniels Midland,
Jungbunzlauer.
Duration: U.S., August 1993 to June 1995; Europe, 1987 to June
1995.
A.21 Sorbates
Product description: Sorbates are chemical preservatives (antimicrobial
agents) capable of retarding or preventing growth of micro-organisms,
such as yeast, bacteria, molds or fungi. Used primarily in food and bev-
erages, their principal mechanisms are to reduce water availability and
increase acidity. Sometimes these additives also preserve other impor-
tant food characteristics such as flavor, color, texture, and nutritional
value. In addition to their use as a preservative in food and beverages,
sorbates also perform well in the stabilization of other types of products
such as pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, pet food, and animal feed.
Geographic markets: During the period considered, the sorbates
market was characterized by important trade flows between European
Member States, as well as between the Contracting Parties to the EEA
Agreement. European sorbates production is concentrated in a small
number of sites – there are only two European producers, Hoechst and
Cheminova, which have their production facilities in Frankfurt, and in
Harboore, respectively. Although Chisso, Daicel, Nippon and Ueno do
not produce sorbates in Europe, they sold their products in almost
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every Member State both directly to end-users and through a network
of independent distributors in the different European countries.
Companies: Chisso Corporation, Daicel Chemical Industries,
Hoechst, The Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ueno Fine
Chemicals Industry.
Duration: 1978 to November 1996 (except for Nippon who colluded
until December 1995).
A.22 Vitamins
Product description: Vitamins are a group of micronutrients of vari-
ous types of organic compounds required in small amounts in human
and animal diet for normal growth, development, and maintenance of
life. Their physiological function in the organism and mode of action
are diverse. Some vitamins are essential sources of certain coenzymes
necessary for metabolism, others are involved in the metabolism of
other vitamins. All known vitamins can be synthesized chemically. The
products with which this decision is concerned are those bulk synthetic
substances which belong to the following groups of vitamins and closely
related products: A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, C, D3, biotin (H), folic acid
(M), beta-carotene, and carotinoids.
Geographic markets: The European Commission considers the mar-
kets for vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, C, D3, H, folic acid, beta-
carotene, and carotinoids to be at least EEA-wide (there are several
indications that point to worldwide markets for each of the vitamin
products). European bulk vitamin production is concentrated at a small
number of sites. Most Community/EEA Member States import the
totality of their bulk vitamin requirements, with the vast majority of
this from production originating in another Member State (Denmark,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom).
Companies: F. Hoffmann-La Roche, BASF, Aventis, Lonza, Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Merck KgaA, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Eisai Co.,
Kongo Chemical, Sumitomo Chemical Co., Sumika Fine Chemicals,
Takeda Chemical Industries, Tanabe Seiyaku Co.
Duration: (Europe): A, E: September 1989 to February 1999; B1,
January 1991 to June 1994; B2, January 1991 to September 1995; B5,
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January 1991 to February 1999; B6, January 1991 to June 1994; Folic
Acid, January 1991 to June 1994; C, January 1991 to August 1995;
D3, January 1994 to June 1998; H, October 1991 to April 1994; Beta-
carotene, September 1992 to December 1998; Carotinoids, May 1993 to
December 1998.
A.23 Zinc phosphate
Product description: Zinc phosphate is derived from zinc oxide and
phosphoric acid. It is a non-toxic product and usually comes in the
form of a non-cohesive, micronised white powder. Zinc phosphate is
widely used as an anti-corrosion mineral pigment in protective coating
systems. Paint manufacturers use it for the production of anti-corrosive
industrial paints such as automotive, aeronautic, and marine paints.
Geographic markets: Zinc phosphate has traditionally been man-
ufactured in Europe. As it became a high performance product for
export, five producers located in Western Europe hold virtually the
whole of the world market. The rest is produced by two U.S.-based
companies and by a few small producers, generally located in Asia.
Companies: Britannia, Heubach, James Brown, SNCZ, Trident,
Waardals.
Duration: March 1994 to May 1998.
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Sources
• Carbonless paper
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 115/1,
21.4.2004, Case COMP/E-1/36.212 – Carbonless paper,
Decision of December 20, 2001.
• Choline chloride
EC Commission of the European Communities, 9.12.2004,
Case COMP/E-2/37.533 – Choline chloride.
• Citric acid
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 239/18,
6.9.2002, Case COMP/E-1/36.604 – Citric acid, Deci-
sion of December 5, 2001.
Connor, John M., Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are
the Enemy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
• Copper plumbing tubes
EC Commission of the European Communities, Commis-
sion Decision of 3 September 2004 (Case COMP/E-
1/38.069 – copper plumbing tubes)
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• District heating pipes
Competition Policy Newsletter, 1999 February, Number 1,
pp. 27–8.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber)
of 20 March 2002. – ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v
Commission of the European Communities.
• Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products
EC1 Official Journal of the European Union, L 125/45,
28.4.2004, Case No. C.38.359 – Electrical and mechan-
ical carbon and graphite products, Decision of
December 3, 2003.
EC2 Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite prod-
ucts (C.38.359 – Antitrust) [2003] ECComm 82
(3 December 2003).
• Fine arts auction houses
EC Commission of the European Communities, 30.10.2002,
Case COMP/E-2/37.784 Fine Art Auction Houses.
Mason, C., The Art of the Steal: Inside the Sotheby’s
Christie’s Auction House Scandal, New York:
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004.
Ashenfelter, Orley and Kathryn Graddy, “Anatomy of the
Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at
Sotheby’s and Christies’s,” Journal of Competition Law
& Economics, 1 (2005) #1.
Steward, J. B., “Bidding War: How an Antitrust Investi-
gation into Christie’s and Sotheby’s Became a Race
to See Who Could Betray Whom,” The New Yorker,
October 15, 2001.
• Graphite electrodes
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 100/1,
16.4.2002, Case COMP/E-1/36.490 – Graphite elec-
trodes, July 18, 2001.
Levenstein, Margaret and Valerie Suslow, “Private Inter-
national Cartels and Their Effect on Developing Coun-
tries,” University of Massachusetts, 2001.
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• Industrial and medical gases
EC1 Official Journal of the European Union, L 84/1,
1.4.2003, Case COMP/E-3/36.700 – Industrial and
medical gases, Decision of July 24, 2002.
EC2 Commission Decision of July 24, 2002, Case COMP/E-
3/36.700 – Industrial and medical gases.
• Industrial tubes
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 125/50,
28.4.2004, Case C.38.240 – Industrial tubes, Decision
of December 16, 2003.
• Isostatic graphite
EC Commission of the European Communities, Commission
Decision of 17/12/2002 (Case COMP/E-2/37.667 – Spe-
cialty Graphite)
• Lysine
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 152/24,
7.6.2001, Case COMP/36.545/F3 – Amino Acids, Deci-
sion of June 7, 2000.
Connor, John M., Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are
the Enemy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
Eichenwald, Kurt, Informant: A True Story, : Broadway
Books, 2001.
Lieber, James B., Rats in the Grain: The Dirty Tricks and
Trials of Archer Daniels Midland, New York: Four Walls
Eight Windows, 2000.
• Methionine
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 255/1,
8.10.2003, Case C.37.519, – Methionine, Decision of
July 2, 2002.
• Nucleotides
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 75/1,
12.3.2004, Case COMP/C.37.671 – Flood flavour
enhancers, Decision of December 17, 2002.
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• Organic peroxides
EC1 Commission Decision of 10 December 2003 relating to
a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-
2/37.857 – Organic peroxides.
EC2 Commission of the European Communities, Commis-
sion Decision of 10 December 2003 (Case COMP/E-
2/37.857 – Organic Peroxides)
• Plasterboard
EC Commission of the European Communities, 27.11.2002,
Case COMP/E-1/37.152 – Plasterboard.
• Seamless steel tubes
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 140/1,
6.6.2003, Case IV/E-1/35.860B – Seamless steel tubes,
Decision of December 8, 1999.
• Soda ash
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 10/1,
15.1.2003, Case COMP/33.133-B: Soda-ash – Solvay,
CFK, Decision of December 13, 2000.
• Sodium gluconate
Arbault, François et al. “Commission Adopts Eight New
Decisions Imposing Fines on Hard-Core Cartels.” EC
Competitions Policy Newsletter Number 1 – February
2002: 29–43.
• Sorbates
EC1 Official Journal of the European Union, L 182/20,
13.7.2005, Case No. C.37.370 – Sorbates, Decision of
October 1, 2003.
EC2 Commission of the European Communities, Commis-
sion Decision of 1.10.2003 (Case COMP/E-1/37.370 –
Sorbates)
• Vitamins
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 6/1,
10.1.2003, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, Deci-
sion of November 21, 2001.
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Connor, John M., Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are
the Enemy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
First, Harry, “The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and
the Coming of International Law,” Antitrust Law Jour-
nal, 68 (2001), 711–734.
Levenstein, Margaret and Valerie Suslow, “Private Inter-
national Cartels and Their Effect on Developing Coun-
tries,” University of Massachusetts, 2001.
• Zinc phosphate
EC Official Journal of the European Union, L 153/1,
20.6.2003, Case COMP/E-1/37.027 – Zinc phosphate,
Decision of December 11, 2001.
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